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A NEW LOOK AT NLRB POLICY ON
MULTIEMPLOYER BARGAINING
STEVEN L. WILLBORNt
Multiemployer bargaining, which occurs when two or more em-
ployers in combination bargain with a single union representing employ-
ees of all the employers, is an acceptedpractice in collective bargaining
under the NationalLabor RelationsAct. That Act does not address the
propriety or appropriate dimensions of a multiemployer bargaining unit,
but the National Labor Relations Board has endorsed thispractice and
has taken affirmative steps to protect it. The criteria that the Board
uses in determining whether this type of unit is appropriate in given situ-
ations are varied and often hard to identify In this Article, Professor
Willborn reviews the precepts followed by the Board in making these
decisions and the underlying policy considerations that are the basis of
current Board doctrine. He then discusses the problems in multiem-
ployer bargaining caused by current Board practices. Professor
Willborn concludes by noting the insufficiency of the Board's present
doctrine and suggesting that the Board review and revise its own prac-
tices in an effort to remedy these problems.
Multiemployer bargaining is a common phenomenon in the United
States.' Prototypically, in this type of bargaining structure two or more em-
ployers combine to bargain as a group with a single union that represents em-
ployees at both or all of the companies. 2
The National Labor Relations Act,3 however, says very little about the
multiemployer unit.4 Indeed, even though multiemployer bargaining existed
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. B.A., Northland College, 1974;
M.S., J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1976.
1. In a study of collective bargaining agreements covering 1000 or more workers, the
Bureau of Labor Statistics determined that approximately 42% of the agreements covering approx-
imately 46% of the workers were multiemployer agreements. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Charac-
teristics of Major Collective Bargaining Agreements, January 1, 1978, at 1, 12 (1980).
2. See Rains, Legal Aspects and Problems of Multiemployer Bargaining, 34 B.U.L. Rev.
159, 160 (1954).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as "the Act" or "the NLRA"].
4. The Act contains only one allusion to multiemployer bargaining. Under section
8(b)(4)(A) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1976), it is an unfair labor practice for a union to
"forc[e] or requir[e] any employer or selfemployed person to join any. . . employer organiza-
tion .. " Section 8(b)(4)(A) thus proscribes union attempts to force employers to engage in
multiemployer bargaining. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 401 F. Supp. 370,
372-76 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd in relevant part, 623 F.2d 1354, 1357-59 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 922 (1981); UMW Local 1854 (Amax Coal Co.), 238 N.L.R.B. 1583, 1587-88 (1978);
Glass Workers Local 1892 (Frank J. Rooney, Inc.), 141, N.L.R.B. 106, 116-17 (1963); Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Local 8 (General Ore, Inc.), 126 N.L.R.B. 172, 173 (1960); United Con-
struction Workers (Kanawha Coal Operators' Ass'n), 94 N.L.R.B. 1731, 1732-33 (1951).
Section 8(b)(4)(A) was added to the National Labor Relations Act by the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136, 141 (1947). The present language of section
8(b)(4)(A) was inserted into the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 by the House-Senate
conference committee. See H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 44-45 (1947) (House confer-
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prior to the Act's enactment, 5 the Act explicitly recognizes only "the employer
unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof.' 6 Despite this, multiem-
ployer bargaining structures have been approved 7 and even protected8 by the
National Labor Relations Board and the courts.
The status accorded to multiemployer bargaining has not been without
problems. After outlining the complex and varied determinants of bargaining
structure, this Article describes the Board's current doctrine on multiemployer
bargaining; that is, it reviews the legal principles governing the formation and
ence report), reprinted in 1947 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1135, 1150. The original House bill would
have prohibited almost all, even entirely voluntary, multiemployer bargaining. H.R. 3020, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(16), 9(f)(1), 12(a)(3)(A) (1947). See H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
5-6, 24, 35-36, 86 (1947). The original Senate bill prohibited only involuntary multiemployer
bargaining. S. 1146, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(2), 9(b) (1947). The final bill adopted the Senate
approach but achieved that result with statutory language that differed from the original Senate
bill. Compare Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 141
(1947), with S. 1126, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 2(2), 9(b) (1947). See generally Frito-Lay, Inc. v.
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 401 F. .Supp. 370, 372-76 (N.D. Cal. 1975), afrd in part, 623 F.2d 1354
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 922 (1981) (general review of the legislative history of
section 8(b)(4)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act).
5. In the flint glass industry, for example, a pattern of comprehensive multiemployer bar-
gaining was established by 1888. Somers, Pressures on an Employers' Association in Collective
Bargaining, 6 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 557, 559 (1953). See also F. Pierson, Multi-Employer Bar-
paining: Nature and Scope 8 (1948); Willoughby, Employers Associations for Dealing with Labor
m the United States, 20 Q.J. Econ. 110, 113 (1905); Note, Multiemployer Bargaining and the
National Labor Relations Board, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 886, 886-87 (1953).
6. NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
7. Early in the history of the NLRA, the National Labor Relations Board certified a mul-
tiemployer bargaining unit as appropriate. Shipowners' Ass'n, 7 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1938), appeal
dismissed sub nom. AFL v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1939), afl'd, 308 U.S. 401 (1940). In
Shipowners'4ssociation the Board determined that multiemployer units were encompassed within
the term "employer unit" in section 9(b) of the Act because section 2(2) of the Act as then written,
NLRA, ch. 372, § 2(2), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), defined employer as "any person acting in the interest
of the employer," and section 2(1) of the Act, id. § 2(1), included "associations" within the defini-
tion of person. 7 N.L.R.B. at 1024-25. After the definition of employer in section 2(2) of the Act
was amended to "any person acting as an agent of an employer," Labor Management Relations
Act, ch. 120, § 2(2), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), the Board reaffirmed its determination that multiemployer
units were appropriate. See Furniture Firms, 81 N.L.R.B. 1318, 1320 (1949) ("exhaustive search
and study of the legislative history of the Act, as amended, fails to reveal an intent by Congress to
limit the appropriate unit... to a single employer unit"); Associated Shoe Indus., 81 N.L.R.B.
224 (1949).
The courts have supported the Board's interpretation. The United States Supreme Court has
said that "the Board should continue its administrative practice of certifying multi-employer
units." NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957). The Court sup-
ported its position by pointing to Congress' failure to enact proposals that would have limited or
outlawed multiemployer bargaining. Id. at 95-96. The courts of appeals have also supported the
Board's interpretation. See NLRB v. Beckham, Inc., 564 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1977); NLRB v.
Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967);
NLRB v. Lund, 103 F.2d 815, 819 (8th Cir. 1939). See also NLRB v. New York Typographical
Union No. 6, 632 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1980); McAx Sign Co. v. NLRB, 576 F.2d 62, 66 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); NLRB v. Dover Tavern Owners' Ass'n, 412 F.2d 725,
727 (3d Cir. 1969).
8. The primary way in which the Board and the courts affirmatively protect multiemployer
bargaining structures is by limiting withdrawal rights. To protect the "stability" of multiemployer
bargaining, see Retail Assocs., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 393 (1958); Engineering Metal Prods.
Corp., 92 N.L.R.B. 823, 824 (1950), the Board and the courts have limited withdrawal after the
commencement of negotiations to situations in which both the union and the company consent to
the withdrawal or in which there are unusual circumstances. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sheridan Cre-
ations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245, 247-48 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967); Retail Assocs,,
Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 395"(1958). See also notes 101-36 and accompanying text infra.
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dissolution of multiemployer bargaining units. The Article then identifies and
discusses the public policy underpinnings of the Board's current doctrine;
problems created by that doctrine are also discussed. The Article concludes by
suggesting that the Board take a new, more sophisticated look at the area.
I. DETERMINANTS OF BARGAINING STRUCTURE
The term "appropriate bargaining unit" in labor parlance is a misnomer.
Under the National Labor Relations Act, the appropriate bargaining unit is
really an election constituency.9 Before a representation election, the Board
determines what jobs constitute an appropriate bargaining unit and then em-
ployees occupying those jobs vote on whether they want union representa-
tion.10 If the union is selected as the bargaining representative, the company
and the union may conduct negotiations limited to the terms and conditions of
employment of those employees in the appropriate bargaining unit.II For the
purposes of negotiation, however, the company and the union may agree to
expand the Board-delineated appropriate bargaining unit (really an election
unit) to include other employees represented by the union. 12 If the negotiation
unit is expanded to include other employees 13 represented by the union and
those employees are not employed by the same company, a multiemployer
bargaining structure is established. To avoid confusion, this Article will use
the term "election unit" to signify an appropriate bargaining unit defined by
the Board for the purpose of conducting a representation election and the term
"negotiation unit" to signify the bargaining unit formed for the purpose of
conducting negotiations.
Multiemployer election and negotiation units are essentially consensual
in nature.14 That is, such units are generally formed only with the mutual
consent, actual or implied, of both the union and the companies. Conse-
quently, the reasons unions and companies decide to engage in multiemployer
bargaining are of great import because to a large extent those reasons deter-
mine the scope and frequency of multiemployer bargaining. Identification
and description of the major determinants of multiemployer negotiation units
are necessary to an understanding of Board policy.
A variety of interrelated factors is relevant to unions and companies in
deciding whether to utilize a multiemployer negotiation unit. Professor
Weber, in an insightful article, has organized these factors into five categories:
9. See NLRA § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976).
10. See generally R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law: Unionization and Collective Bar-
gaining 66 (1976).
11. Both the company, NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976), and the union, NLRA
§ 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3), are under an obligation to bargain in good faith about the terms
and conditions of employment of those employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.
12. See R. Gorman, supra note 10, at 66.
13. "Other employees" refers to employees other than those occupying jobs in the Board-
delineated appropriate bargaining unit.
14. The legal doctrines governing the formation and dissolution of multiemployer election
and negotiation units will be discussed in detail in a later section of this Article. See notes 84-99
and accompanying text infra. See generally C. Morris, The Developing Labor Law 238-39 (1971).
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market factors; the nature of bargaining issues; representational factors; gov-
ernment policies; and power tactics in the bargaining process.' 5 Another cate-
gory, bargaining efficiency, also affects the incidence of multiemployer
bargaining. Finally, public interests influence the bargaining unit decision.
These public interests probably have little impact on the unions and compa-
nies making negotiation unit decisions. Nevertheless, they should guide the
government in determining its role in influencing such decisions.
Market factors strongly influence the negotiation unit decisions of both
unions and companies. Unions have generally provided the impetus for mar-
ket-wide negotiation units:
Unions generally have sought to devise bargaining structures that are
coextensive with the specific market(s) encompassed by their jurisdic-
tions. In building such structures unions may hope to attain their
traditional goal of "taking wages out of competition" by insuring the
uniformity of wage rates among producers who operate in the same
market.16
Thus, market-wide negotiation units further the traditional union goal of stan-
dardized wages and working conditions 17 and may weaken employer resist-
ance to union demands since the increased costs of such demands will be
borne by all employers operating in the market.'8
The negotiation unit decisions of employers may also be influenced by
market factors. When there is severe competition between many firms in a
product market, management may favor a multiemployer bargaining unit be-
cause that unit may impose some measure of regulation on market behavior.' 9
A multiemployer bargaining unit may reduce or eliminate labor costs as a
competitive factor and shift the competition to other factors like quality, effi-
ciency and technological improvement.20 Other market factors may influence
the negotiation unit decisions of employers. In the construction industry, for
15. Weber, Stability and Change in the Structure of Collective Bargaining, in Challenges to
Collective Bargaining 13, 15 (1967).
16. Weber, supra note 15, at 15. See also N. Feinsinger, Collective Bargaining in the Truck-
ing Industry 38 (1949); 0. Pollak, Social Implications of Industry-Wide Bargaining 6-7 (1948);
Chamberlain, Determinants of Collective Bargaining Structures, in The Structure of Collective
Bargaining 3, 11 (A. Weber ed. 1961).
17. See Comment, The Status of Multiemployer Bargaining Under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 1967 Duke L.L 558, 560; Note, Labor Law-Third Circuit Holds Impasse in Bargaining
Excuses Employer's Unilateral Withdrawal from Multiemployer Negotiations, 44 Fordham L.
Rev. 1256, 1257; Note, supra note 5, at 887.
18. See W. Fisher, Collective Bargaining in the Bituminous Coal Industry: An Appraisal 42
(1948); Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1183, 1208 (1980); Comment, supra
note 17, at 560-61 n.8.
19. C. Kerr & R. Randall, Collective Bargaining in the Pacific Coast Pulp and Paper Indus-
try 8-9 (1948); Weber, supra note 15, at 16. The likelihood of management acceptance of a mul-
tiemployer negotiation unit will be lessened if union representation does not substantially cover
the product market or if the nature of the product market, because of a significant cross-elasticity
of demand, makes it impossible or unlikely that the major companies in the product market can
be included in the multiemployer negotiation unit. See Weber, supra note 15, at 16-17. Because
of these factors, the existence of substantial competition from foreign companies may reduce the
willingness of domestic companies to enter into multiemployer negotiation units confined to do-
mestic companies.
20. Rains, supra note 2, at 162.
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example, the market provides only intermittent business for construction com-
panies. Consequently, a multiemployer negotiation unit is often utilized be-
cause it permits a mechanism whereby employer members of the
multiemployer negotiation unit can, in effect, share employees:
We [construction contractors] have flexibility unknown any-
where else in the Western world. When we need another 10, 20, or
100 pipefitters, we call the union hall, and within a reasonably short
period we have these men working. Conversely, when our volume
drops, these men are sent back to their labor depository to be called
to work by some other contractor.
So a union contractor has this ready pool of trained men and
this readily available degree of flexibility. A union employing con-
tractor's only limitation on his volume of work is his ambition,
financial capability and executive talent. A non-union contractor has
these limitations plus the number of skilled men he has available,
and this governs the volume of work he can perform.21
The nature of bargaining issues may also influence negotiation unit deci-
sions. To the extent the major issues are market-wide, a multiemployer nego-
tiation unit may be an efficient and desirable structure for their resolution.22
Indeed, issues that transcend the capabilities of individual employers, such as
pension benefits or industry-wide training programs, may be subject to resolu-
tion only through a multiemployer negotiation unit.23 On the other hand, to
the extent the salient bargaining issues are local in nature, a multiemployer
negotiation unit may be cumbersome and inefficient. For example, if "work
rules, safety, wash-up time and other minutiae of industrial relations"2 4 are
the salient issues, a localized negotiation unit would be preferable. Many, if
not most, negotiations cover both market-wide and local issues. Conse-
quently, the bargaining structure may attempt to allocate the issues to sepa-
rate, but overlapping, negotiation units.25 In the trucking industry local issues
are decided by smaller, more localized negotiation units. Those units are then
combined into a larger, multiemployer negotiation unit for decisions on the
broader, market-wide issues.26
Representational factors also influence negotiation unit decisions. For
21. Industrial Relations Research Ass'n, Collective Bargaining: Contemporary American
Experience 63 (G. Somers ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Contemporary American].
22. Weber, supra note 15, at 17.
23. See Comment, supra note 17, at 561; Note, Labor Law, supra note 17, at 1257.
24. Weber, supra note 15, at 17.
25. The National Labor Relations Board has approved bargaining structures that assign cer-
tain issues to a multiemployer negotiation unit and other issues to a more localized negotiation
unit. Kroger Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 569, 573 (1964); Radio Corp. of Am., 135 N.L.R.B. 980, 982
(1962). Cf. NLRB v. Miller Brewing Co., 408 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1969) (local bargaining on
uniquely local issues may be required of an employer member of a multiemployer negotiation
unit).
26. Contemporary American, supra note 21, at 141. A similar allocation of issues between
overlapping local and market-wide negotiation units takes place in the steel industry. See id. at
164-67.
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unions, broad multiemployer negotiation units may result in dissatisfaction at
the local level. While smaller, more localized negotiation units may be willing
to combine into a multiemployer negotiation unit to augment their bargaining
power, acceptance of the larger unit inevitably results in the relinquishment of
certain individualized local goals. The local negotiation units should continue
to accept a multiemployer unit, however, as long as "the gains derived from
the increment to bargaining power are greater than the perceived losses associ-
ated with the denial of autonomy in decision-making. '27 At some point,
though, the perceived losses will outweigh the gains and political pressure in-
side the union will build for smaller negotiation units.28 In the coal industry,
for example, dissatisfaction at the local level with the results of multiemployer
bargaining has strained the existing multiemployer bargaining structure.29
Thus, problems in adequately representing localized negotiation units may un-
dermine union efforts to establish a multiemployer negotiation unit.
Unions may favor multiemployer negotiation units for another reason
related to representation. After a period of bargaining in a multiemployer
negotiation unit, the National Labor Relations Board may find that a mul-
tiemployer election unit is appropriate.30 In most cases, a multiemployer elec-
tion unit will enhance union security; a rival union must gain the allegiance of
a much larger number of workers before it can replace the incumbent union.3'
The negotiation unit decisions of employers are also affected by represen-
tational considerations. As with unions, a calculus of anticipated gains and
losses underlies the decision to join in an employer alliance.3 2 In the truck-
ing3 3 and construction3 4 industries, internal divisions between employers have
weakened multiemployer negotiations and, indeed, may lead to more decen-
tralized negotiation units.35
Government policies are also relevant to unions and companies making a
bargaining structure decision. National Labor Relations Board recognition of
27. Weber, supra note 15, at 18.
28. Id.
29. See Contemporary American, supra note 21, at 46-47, 581. See also Wall St. J., Jan. 22,
1981, at 23, col. 4.
30. See, e.g., I. Miller & Bro., Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 924 (1962); Motor Cargo, Inc., 108 N.L.R.B.
716 (1954); Grand Rapids Fuel Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1954). See also notes 90-98 and accompa-
nying text infra.
31. See, e.g., Alston Coal Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 683 (1939). See also C. Kerr & R. Randall, supra
note 19, at 28; Note, supra note 5, at 887. Union security may also be enhanced because organized
employer-members of a multiemployer group have an interest in seeing that the plants of their
competitors either become or remain unionized. See 0. Pollak, supra note 16, at 7-8; R. Tilove,
Collective Bargaining in the Steel Industry 40 (1948) (multiemployer bargaining makes it "more
difficult for fragments of the industry. . . to shake off the union"); Kassalow, How Some Euro-
pean Nations Avoided U.S. Levels of Industrial Conffict, 101 Monthly Lab. Rev. 4, 37 (1978)
(employer associations encouraged comparable companies to recognize unions so that the associa-
tions could ensure that competitors would not obtain more desirable labor contracts).
32. G. Bahrs, The San Francisco Employers' Council 24-25, 38 (1948); C. Kerr & R. Randall,
supra note 19, at 24-25; Weber, supra note 15, at 19.
33. Contemporary American, supra note 21, at 71-72.
34. Id. at 139-41.
35. Id. at 583.
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multiemployer election units36 may encourage some unions to enter into mul-
tiemployer negotiation units because of the potential beneficial effect on union
security.37 Conversely, if a company perceives the union as having the sup-
port of only a narrow majority of its workers, that company may be dissuaded
from entering into a multiemployer negotiation unit for fear of increasing the
security of the "shaky" union. Similarly, the National Labor Relations Board
has imposed restrictions on the ability of unions and employers to withdraw
from multiemployer negotiation units.3s This policy may inhibit the forma-
tion of multiemployer negotiation units since unions and companies may be
unwilling to bind themselves to a bargaining structure that may prove un-
workable or disadvantageous.
Government policies may also have a less direct, but nevertheless real,
impact on bargaining structure decisions. In NLRB v. Local 449, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters,39 the Supreme Court held that if one member of a
multiemployer negotiation unit is struck, the other employer members of the
unit could lawfully lockout their employees.40 This governmental policy pro-
vided employers in multiemployer negotiation units with a tool to combat
whipsawing4t and, hence, may have influenced the bargaining structure deci-
sions of both employers and unions. 42 The steel industry provides another
example of the indirect influence of government policies. In the steel industry
the movement towards market-wide bargaining was hastened by the ever-
present threat of government intervention in the event of a disruptive bargain-
ing impasse.43
Power tactics are, of course, a major consideration in the formation of
36. See, e.g., Taylor Motors, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 711 (1979). See also notes 84-98 and accom-
panying text infra.
37. See notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra.
38. "Where actual bargaining negotiations based on the existing multiemployer unit have
begun, we would not permit, except on mutual consent, an abandonment of the unit upon which
each side has committed itself to the other, absent unusual circumstances." Retail Assocs., Inc.,
120 N.L.R.B. 388, 395 (1958). See also notes 101-36 and accompanying text infra.
39. 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
40. Id. at 97. See also NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
41. In a whipsaw strike, a union strikes one or more, but not all members of a multiem-
ployer unit or uses a similar tactic with a group of employers with whom it bargais
individually over the same terms at the same time. Because the employers are usually in
competition with each other the struck employer will lose business to the others if they
continue to operate. The union is thus able to bring enormous pressure upon the struck
employer to settle.
Bernhardt, Lockouts: An Analysis of Board and Court Decisions Since Brown and American
S'h , 57 Cornell L. Rev. 211,212 n.6 (1972). See also NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449,353 U.S.
87, 90 n.7 (1957); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Local 137, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 623 F.2d 1354, 1359 n.6
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 922 (1981).
42. See C. Kerr & R. Randall, supra note 19, at 9. The impact of this governmental policy on
the bargaining structure decisions of unions and companies has been minimized by subsequent
court and Board decisions. Later decisions have recognized the lockout rights of employers who
are not members of multiemployer negotiation units. See American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB,
380 U.S. 300 (1965); Weyerhaeuser Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 299 (1967); Evening News Ass'n, 166
N.L.R.B. 219 (1967), enforced, 404 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1968). See also Darling & Co., 171
N.L.R.B. 801 (1968), afl'd sub nom. Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
43. Contemporary American, supra note 20, at 166-67. See also F. Pierson, supra note 5, at
46; 0. Pollak, supra note 16, at 25-36.
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multiemployer bargaining units. Simply stated, employers negotiating as a
group may be in a better position to match the strength of organized labor44
and unions may be willing to accept the increase in employer economic power
in the belief that wages can be both standardized and taken out of
competition. 45
Finally, notions of bargaining efficiency may affect the bargaining struc-
ture decision. "By negotiating a single contract rather than many, employers
may pool their resources and consequently are often able to afford the services
of a highly skilled, professional negotiator, while unions are able to save the
expense and time involved to negotiate separate contracts with each
employer." 46
There are, then, many and complex factors influencing the negotiation
unit decisions of management and labor. In addition to these factors, there are
broader public policy considerations that should affect the government's poli-
cies on multiemployer bargaining. One consideration is the effect of multiem-
ployer bargaining on the economy and, specifically, on the inflation rate.
Some commentators argue that if wages are removed from competition by
multiemployer bargaining, consumers might be unduly burdened by wage in-
creases that are not tempered by competition.47 Moreover, the cooperation
between employers fostered by multiemployer bargaining may result in in-
creases in other anticompetitive practices that would also raise the inflation
rate and be harmful to consumers. 48 On the other hand, multiemployer bar-
gaining may enable employers to avoid "leap-frogging" and its inevitable in-
flationary bias.49 The extent and severity of multiemployer work stoppages is
another relevant public policy consideration. While multiemployer work stop-
pages would probably be more massive and have a greater impact on the econ-
omy,50 there may be fewer work stoppages under a multiemployer bargaining
structure than under a single employer structure.
51
44. See G. Bahrs, supra note 32, at 18-19; J. Freidin, The Taft-Hartley Act and Multi-Em-
ployer Bargaining 4-5 (1948); C. Kerr & R. Randall, supra note 19, at 3-4; 0. Pollak, supra note
16, at 2, 66; Comment, supra note 17, at 559; Note, Labor Law, supra note 17, at 1257. See also
Contemporary American, supra note 21, at 71.
45. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
46. Comment, supra note 17, at 561 (footnotes omitted). See also R. Gorman, supra note 10,
at 86-87; C. Kerr & R. Randall, supra note 19, at 9-10; Note, Labor Law, supra note 17, at 1257.
47. See W. Fisher, supra note 18, at 42-43; Rains, supra note 2, at 162; Note, supra note 5, at
888.
48. See R. Gorman, supra note 10, at 87.
49. "Leap-frogging" is the result of competition between various negotiation units. The em-
ployees in one negotiation unit obtain a settlement, the employees in the next negotiation unit
obtain a slightly higher settlement, and so on. Leap-frogging has been a recurrent phenomenon in
the construction industry. See Contemporary American, supra note 21, at 74.
50. See R. Gorman, supra note 10, at 87; 0. Pollak, supra note 16, at 2; Rains, supra note 2,
at 162; Note, supra note 5, at 888.
51. There are several factors supporting this conclusion: (I) more experienced negotiators
may be involved; (2) employees in a particular negotiation unit need not strike in the fear that
employees in other negotiation units will obtain a more advantageous settlement; and (3) the
external effect of the strike and potential adverse public reaction may facilitate agreements short
of economic action. See Rains, supra note 2, at 162. See generally C. Kerr & R. Randall, supra
note 19, at 28-29; F. Pierson, supra note 5, at 43-44.
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The guidance provided by these abstract public policy considerations is
minimal. In the absence of empirical evidence on the inflationary impact of
multiemployer bargaining and on the extent and severity of multiemployer
work stoppages,52 these considerations are little more than conjecture. Never-
theless, there is an established public policy on multiemployer bargaining, a
public policy that is expressed through Board and court decisions.
II. CURRENT BOARD DOCTRINE ON MULTIEMPLOYER
BARGAINING STRUCTURES
Multiemployer bargaining structures are essentially consensual in na-
ture.53 Such structures can be formed initially only with the consent of the
participating employers54 and union.55 Board doctrine on multiemployer bar-
gaining structures, however, is not limited to noninterference with voluntary
multiemployer bargaining structures. Rather, current Board policy affirma-
tively supports and protects such structures.5 6 This support and protection is
most apparent in two areas: (1) Board recognition of multiemployer election
and negotiation units and (2) Board limitations on employer and union with-
drawal from multiemployer negotiation units. The Board doctrine in these
two areas and the public policy underpinnings of this doctrine merit further
discussion.
.4 Board Recognition of Multiemployer Election and Negotiation Units
Current Board policy supports and protects multiemployer bargaining
52. The author knows of no such empirical evidence.
53. The test [for determining whether a multiemployer bargaining structure has been
established] is whether the employer members of the group have indicated from the out-
set an unequivocal intention to be bound by group action in collective bargaining, and
whether the union, being informed of the delegation of bargaining authority to the
group, has assented and entered into negotiations with the group representative.
NLRB v. Beckham, Inc., 564 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1977). See also Steamship Trade Ass'n, 155
N.L.R.B. 232 (1965). See generally note 4 supra.
54. See, e.g., McAx Sign Co. v. NLRB, 576 F.2d 62, 66 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1116 (1979); NLRB v. Hart, 453 F.2d 215, 217-18 (9th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Bagel Bakers Council,
434 F.2d 884, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971); NLRB v. Dover Tavern
Owners' Ass'n, 412 F.2d 725, 727 (3d Cir. 1969); Ruan Transport Corp., 234 N.L.R.B. 241, 242
(1978); Van Eerden Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 496, 499 (1965); Kroger Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 569, 573 (1964).
55. See, e.g., Authorized Air Conditioning Co. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 899, 905 (8th Cir. 1979);
Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 357, 357 (1976), enforced, 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979); Dancker & Sellow, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 824, 825-26 (1963), enforced
sub nom. NLRB v. Local 210, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 330 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1964); Mohawk Busi-
ness Mach. Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 248, 249 (1956).
56. It should be noted at the outset that the Board has not wholeheartedly supported mul-
tiemployer bargaining structures. The Board does not require the establishment of multiemployer
units; single employer units are still presumptively appropriate. See, e.g., Cab Operating Corp.,
153 N.L.R.B. 878, 879-80 (1965). Nevertheless, Board doctrine in the area does tacitly support
and protect multiemployer bargaining structures. This section of the article will discuss that tacit
support and protection.
It should also be noted that no claim is made that the Board intends actively to support
multiemployer bargaining. Rather, in light of the Board's woefully inadequate analysis of public
policy in the area, see notes 147-63 and accompanying text infra, it is likely that the Board has
"generally... acted inadvertantly rather than by conscious design." The Structure of Collective
Bargaining at xxix (A. Weber ed. 1961).
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structures by recognizing multiemployer election and negotiation units in situ-
ations that explicitly or tacitly encourage multiemployer bargaining or, at the
least, bolster the status of multiemployer bargaining as a bargaining structure
option. These situations, and the factors the Board relies on in recognizing
multiemployer election and negotiation units, can be identified through a re-
view of Board decisions in this area.
There are several situations in which Board recognition of multiemployer
election and negotiation units encourages or bolsters multiemployer bargain-
ing. One situation is Board recognition of multiemployer election units where
an election petition has been filed with respect to a single employer-member of
a multiemployer negotiation unit.57 This situation usually arises when a rival
union petitions for a representation election with respect to a single employer
who is a member of a multiemployer negotiation unit.58 A Board policy that
single employer, or small, election units are conclusively presumed to be ap-
propriate59 would risk fragmentation of the existing multiemployer negotia-
tion unit.60 Rather than risk such fragmentation, the Board has protected
multiemployer bargaining structures in these situations by dismissing petitions
for elections in single employer units and permitting elections only in mul-
tiemployer election units.61 The Board policy of recognizing multiemployer
election units should encourage incumbent unions to engage in multiemployer
bargaining because this bargaining would support Board recognition of a mul-
tiemployer election unit62 and this election unit would enhance the security of
the incumbent union.63
Board policy also encourages or bolsters multiemployer bargaining in sit-
uations where an employer-member of a multiemployer bargaining group re-
57. The issue whether to recognize a single employer or a multiemployer election unit can
arise regardless of the identity of the petitioner. The petitioner can be (1) a rival union, see, e.g., I.
Miller & Bro., Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 924 (1962); Carbondale Retail Druggists' Ass'n, 131 N.L.R.B.
1021 (1961), (2) a disgruntled employee seeking decertification, see, e.g., Schaetzel Trucking, Inc.,
250 N.L.R.B. 321 (1980); Grand Rapids Fuel Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1954); American Bakeries
Co. (Merita Bakery), 103 N.L.R.B. 434 (1953), or (3) an employer, see, e.g., Ainsworth Sentry, 242
N.L.R.B. 1221 (1979).
58. See, e.g., I. Miller & Bro. Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 924 (1962); Carbondale Retail Druggists'
Ass'n, 131 N.L.R.B. 1021 (1961).
59. A plain reading of section 9(b) of the Act---'[the election unit] shall be the employer unit,
craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof"-would support such a conclusive presumption.
NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976). The Board, however, has been unwilling to accept such
a plain reading of the statute. See notes 6-7 and accompanying text supra, and notes 57-99 and
accompanying text infra.
60. If a single employer election unit is approved by the Board and the rival union wins the
election, the multiemployer negotiation unit will not be able to continue unless the rival union and
the ousted union agree to cooperate. Such cooperation is unlikely immediately after an election
campaign.
61. See, e.g., Motor Cargo, Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 716 (1954) (single employer election unit
sought by a rival union was found to be inappropriate because there was a substantial history of
multiemployer bargaining). Accord, L Miller & Bro. Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 924 (1962); Taylor and
Boggis Foundry Div., 98 N.L.R.B. 481 (1952).
62. For the factors the Board relies on in determining the appropriateness of multiemployer
election units, see notes 84-98 and accompanying text infra.
63. See notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra. But see Taylor Motors, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B.
711 (1979).
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fuses to sign a collective bargaining contract negotiated and agreed upon by
the group. In the absence of Board recognition of multiemployer negotiation
units, the union response in such a situation would be limited to economic
action.64 The Board, however, recognizes multiemployer negotiation units
and requires employer-members of multiemployer negotiation units to sign
contracts negotiated on their behalf by the negotiators for the unit.65 Conse-
quently, because of the Board's recognition of multiemployer negotiation
units,66 unions have a response in addition to economic action: the filing of an
unfair labor practice charge.67
This Board policy may encourage multiemployer bargaining. If unions
can reach agreement with the multiemployer group, they are assured of stan-
dardized wages and terms and conditions of employment 68 without resorting
to economic action against individual employers.69 In addition, many em-
ployers may favor the policy. If an agreement is reached between a union and
a multiemployer negotiation unit, employers can rest assured that their com-
petitors and fellow employer-members will be burdened with the same labor
contract and will not be able to renegotiate a separate and more advantageous
deal.70
64. The union could utilize its economic weapons in an attempt to coerce the recalcitrant
employer-members to sign the collective bargaining contract. Typically, the union's economic
weapons take the form of the strike, the picket line and the boycott. See R. Smith, L. Merrifield &
T. St. Antoine, Labor Relations Law 261 (1979).
65. See, e.g., Smith's Management Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. 1156, 1157 (1972); Homer Gale, 176
N.L.R.B. 1049, 1051-52 (1969). See also McAx Sign Co. v. NLRB, 576 F.2d 62, 66-68 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); NLRB v. Beckham, Inc., 564 F.2d 190, 192-95 (5th Cir.
1977).
66. It could be argued that this Board doctrine is nothing more than an application of the
Board policy that an employer may be bound by the actions of its agents. Thus, if an employer
gives an agent the authority to negotiate and enter into a contract and the agent does so, the
employer will be bound by that contract. NLRB v. Coletti Color Prints, Inc., 387 F.2d 298, 302-04
(2d Cir. 1967), enforcing 159 N.L.R.B. 1593, 1593-94 (1966); J.E. Cote, 101 N.L.R.B. 1486, 1507,
1513 (1952).
The Board's multiemployer doctrine, however, expands the policy noted above. First, the
Board has found multiemployer negotiation units to exist in situations where it may have been
reluctant to find an agency relationship. See, e.g., Kroger Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 569, 573 (1964) (mul-
tiemployer negotiation unit may be recognized "even though the employer may not have specifi-
cally delegated to an employer group the authority to represent it in collective bargaining or given
the employer group the power to execute final and binding agreements on its behal '). See gener-
ally notes 84-99 and accompanying text infra. Second, the Board's multiemployer negotiation
unit rule has a greater impact than the agency rule because the Board does not impose rigid limits
on withdrawal from ordinary agency relationships, but it does on withdrawal from multiemployer
negotiation units. See notes 102-19 and accompanying text infra. Third, the obligation to bargain
on a multiemployer basis survives even if the bargaining agent ceases to exist. Lehigh Lumber
Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 675, 676 n.4 (1978), enforced, 89 Lab. Cas. 12,157 (3d Cir. 1979).
67. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976) provides that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively" with a union that represents that em-
ployer's employees. Section 8(d) of the Act, id. § 158(d), defines "bargain collectively" to include
"the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached." Consequently, the
refusal of an employer-member of a multiemployer negotiation unit to sign a collective bargaining
contract negotiated and agreed upon by the group is a violation of section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
68. Standardized wages and terms and conditions of employment are a traditional union
goal. See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra.
69. See notes 65-67 and accompanying text supra.
70. See notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra.
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Multiemployer bargaining structures are also encouraged by Board policy
on secondary boycotts. Board recognition of a multiemployer negotiation
unit, under current Board policy, will allow unions to engage in conduct that,
but for the multiemployer negotiation unit, would be an impermissible secon-
dary boycott.71 Assume, for example, that Union represents the employees of
three separate companies engaged in the manufacture of bicycles: Company
A assembles bicycles; Company B manufactures bicycle frames and sells them
to Company A and other companies; and Company C manufactures bicycle
components other than frames and sells them to Company A and other com-
panies. The Union and Companies A, B, and C engage in multiemployer bar-
gaining72 and enter into a collective bargaining contract that includes a
"frame" clause intended to preserve the work of welding frames for the em-
ployees of the multiemployer negotiation unit.
71. The term "secondary boycott" has been concisely defined by Judge Learned Hand:
The gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the employer
who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern in it.
Its aim is to compel him to stop business with the employer in the hope that this will
induce the employer to give in to his employees' demands.
International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1950).
Despite the historic use of secondary boycotts as a union tactical weapon, the National Labor
Relations Act has restricted their use. Professor Leslie has capsulized the public policy arguments
for and against this restriction:
[Secondary boycotts have been restricted for several reasons.] First, it is unfair to the
primary employer (the one with whom the union has its dispute, either organizational or
economic) to permit the union to enlist the aid of a secondary employer in what should
be an intrafamily struggle; the enlistment of the secondary distorts the economics of the
marketplace .... Second, it is unfair to the secondary employer to subject it to union
economic coercion merely because the secondary does business with an offending em-
ployer over which it has no control. Third, the proliferation of labor disputes injures the
public and should thus be minimized; since the secondary boycott makes two (or more)
disputes out of one, it should be prohibited.
Counter-arguments come less easily to mind, but consider a few of the possible
responses. First, fairness is, after all, in the eye (or the pocket) of the beholder....
Where the employers are interdependent, there is no reason to arbitrarily limit the focus
of union pressure to a "primary" employer... Nor are secondary boycotts necessarily
more harmful to secondary employers than the effects of primary strikes, a distributor
may be devastated by a primary strike which closes down a major manufacturer. There
is no reason to single out secondary boycotts for special treatment. As to the third argu-
ment, the public impact of a strike depends on the nature of the employer and the dura-
tion of the strike, not on whether it is primary or secondary.
D. Leslie, Cases and Materials on Labor Law: Process and Policy 285-86 (1979).
Sections 8(b)(4)(A) and (B) and 8(e) are the provisions of the Act that restrict the use of
secondary boycotts. Section 8(b)(4)(B) prohibits unions from engaging in or persuading or coerc-
ing others to engage in secondary boycotts. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976). Section 8(e) prohib-
its unions and employers from entering into agreements whereby the employer agrees to engage in
a secondary boycott of another employer. Id. § 158(e). Section 8(b)(4)(A) prohibits union eco-
nomic action to acquire an agreement prohibited by section 8(e). Id. § 158(b)(4)(A). See D. Les-
lie, supra, at 286. See generally Farmer, Secondary Boycotts-Loopholes Closed or Reopened?,
52 Geo. L.J. 392 (1964); Goetz, Secondary Boycotts and the LMRA: A Path Through the Swamp,
19 Kan. L. Rev. 651 (1971); Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 Colum. L. Rev.
1363 (1962).
72. The formation of a multiemployer negotiation unit and subsequent Board recognition
thereof is not precluded because the employers are engaged in different lines of business or be-
cause the employees in the putative unit have diverse job responsibilities. See, e.g., Safeway
Stores, Inc., 98 N.L.R.B. 528, 529-30 (1952); Cloth Laying Appliances Corp., 78 N.L.R.B. 785,786(1948).
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Under current Board policy, if Companies A, B and C engaged in single
employer bargaining, the Union and Companies A and C would violate sec-
tion 8(e)73 of the National Labor Relations Act if they agreed to the frame
clause.74 The clause would be secondary and, hence, impermissible. 75 Its ob-
jective would not be to satisfy Union objectives with respect to Companies A
and C and their employees, but rather to satisfy Union objectives elsewhere;
specifically, the Union objective would be to preserve work for employees of
Company B. Similarly, if Company A bought frames welded by a company
other than Company B and Company A's employees refused to handle the
frames, the Union would violate section 8(b)(4)(B) 76 of the Act.77 Once again,
the Union's objectives would be secondary because they are directed to the
labor relations of Company B. 78 The Union and Company B, on the other
hand, could agree to the frame clause without violating section 8(e) because
the objective of the clause would be to preserve work traditionally done by
Company B's employees and, hence, the clause would be primary.7 9
The multiemployer bargaining structure, however, permits Companies A
and C to agree to the clause without violating the Act.80 Once a multiem-
73. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
74. As noted in note 71 supra, it is an unfair labor practice under Section 8(e) for "any labor
organization and any employer to enter into any contract.. . whereby such employer. . . agrees
to... refrain from. . dealing in any of the products of any other employer. ... ." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(e) (1976). Through the frame clause, Companies A and C agree to refrain from buying
frames welded by any company other than Company B. That restriction on their liberty to deal
with other employers violates section 8(e). See, e.g., Brown v. Local No. 17, Amalgamated Li-
thographers, 180 F. Supp. 294, 303 (N.D. Cal. 1960) (a clause that "limit[s] and possibly deter-
mine[s an employer's] freedom to change his mind" about with whom he deals violates section
8(e)); Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees, Local Union No. 537, 147 N.L.R.B. 230, 235 (1964)
(section 8(e) is violated where "the employer is restricted in his liberty to deal with others").
75. Even if a clause has the effect of limiting an employer's dealings with other employers,
see note 74 supra, it does not violate section 8(e) if the Union's objective was primary, that is, if it
is addressed to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees. Na-
tional Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 645 (1967). For example, if the clause is
designed to preserve work traditionally done by the contracting employer's employees, the clause
does not violate the Act even though it may also have the effect of interfering with the employer's
freedom to deal with other employers. Id. at 635. See also NLRB v. International Longshore-
men's Ass'n, 447 U.S. 490, 504-05 (1980); NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507,
517 (1977). On the other hand, if a clause is "tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives
elsewhere," National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. at 644-45, it is secondary and,
hence, impermissible. See also NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447 U.S. at 504,
NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. at 519-20.
76. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976).
77. As noted in note 71 supra, it is an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(4)(B) for a
union to "force]. . . any person to cease.. . dealing in the products of any other producer."
Through their refusal to handle the frames, Company A's employees are attempting to force Com-
pany A to cease dealing in the products of the other company.
78. As with section 8(e), see note 75 supra, section 8(b)(4)(B) is directed only against secon-
dary activities. See NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447 U.S. at 504-05; NLRB v.
Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. at 510-11; National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386
U.S. at 633-35. In the instant case, however, the Union's objectives are secondary; Company A's
employees are not attempting to preserve work they traditionally perform, but rather to preserve
work traditionally performed by employees of Company B.
79. See NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447 U.S. at 504-05; NLRB v. Enter-
prise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. at 517-20; National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S.
at 644.
80. The clause may still be subject to attack under the antitrust laws. Inasmuch as Company
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ployer negotiation unit is formed, the unit itself is considered the "employer"
for bargaining purposes.8 ' Consequently, since the frame clause preserves
work traditionally done by employees of the "employer," the clause is pri-
mary.82 Similarly, if Company A purchases frames welded by a company
other than Company B, Company A's employees would not violate section
8(b)(4)(B) by refusing to handle the frames; the employees' activity would be
primary because the objective would be to affect the labor policies of the "em-
ployer"--the multiemployer negotiation unit.83
In summary, Board recognition of multiemployer negotiation units in sec-
ondary boycott situations encourages unions to engage in multiemployer bar-
gaining because it increases the breadth of permissible work preservation
agreements and of economic action to enforce such agreements.
Board recognition of multiemployer election and negotiation units, then,
may affect the outcome of disputes in several situations. Nevertheless, despite
the significance of such recognition, the Board has been unable definitively to
delineate the factors it relies on in making a multiemployer election or negoti-
ation unit determination. Rather, identifying the precise factors the Board re-
lies on in making these unit determinations is like trying to determine why the
University of North Carolina basketball team has won so consistently. De-
fense, teamwork and individual talent are all clearly relevant factors, but no
one is determinative and, indeed, the mix seems to vary from year to year.
A is in effect agreeing to buy frames only from Company B, the clause is a type of exclusive
dealing contract and may violate the antitrust laws. This would depend on a number of factors,
including the duration of the contract and the share of the market controlled by Company A. See
Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
337 U.S. 293 (1949). See generally L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust §§ 163-71
(1977).
81. See, e.g., Sheridan Creations, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1503, 1506 (1964), enforced, 357 F.2d
245 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967); Grand Rapids Fuel Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1402,
1404 (1954).
82. The "bargaining unit" for which a union may lawfully seek to preserve work for its
members has been defined as the same unit for which separate collective bargaining
occurs, whether it consists of the employees of a single employer, or a multiemployer
association.
Local Union No. 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 197 N.L.R.B. 673, 675 n.10 (1972). Accord, United
Mine Workers (Dixie Mining Co.), 165 N.L.R.B. 467, 468 (1967). See also Local 98, Sheet Metal
Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 433 F.2d 1189, 1199-1201 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Wright, J., dissenting),
quoted with approval in Plumbers and Steam Fitters Local 342 v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 216, 222 n.17
(D.C. Cir. 1979) and Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local 223 v. NLRB, 498 F.2d 687, 693-94
n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Lewis v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 801, 802-03 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See generally
Comment, Secondary Boycotts and Work Preservation, 77 Yale L.J. 1401, 1414-15 (1968). Cf.
Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42, 212 N.L.R.B. 320, 320 (1974); id. at 321 (Jenkins, M., concur-
ring), id. at 324-25 (Miller, C., and Kennedy, M., dissenting); id. at 330-31 (Penfield, A.L.J.);
International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local Union No. 12, 212 N.L.R.B. 343, 353-56 (1974)
(Miller, A.L.J.), rev'd, 545 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1976); Raymond 0. Lewis, 148 N.L.R.B. 249, 253-
55 (1964); id. at 257-60 (Jenkins, M., dissenting). But see International Longshoremen's Union,
208 N.L.R.B. 994, 996, 1007 (1974), enforced sub nom. Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. NLRB, 77 Lab.
Cas. 110,949 (D.C. Cir. 1975), where the Board did not pass upon or adopt dicta in the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's decision that primary and secondary employers may coexist in the same mul-
tiemployer unit.
83. See cases cited in note 82 supra. Cf. Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 386
U.S. 664 (1967) (a refusal to handle by one local in order to protect the work customarily done by
members of a sister local for the same employer does not constitute an illegal secondary boycott).
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Similarly, certain factors are clearly relevant to a multiemployer election or
negotiation unit determination, but no single factor is determinative.
As noted above84 multiemployer bargaining is "rooted in consent."85
Consequently, the touchstone for a multiemployer unit determination is
whether the parties to the putative unit have evidenced an unequivocal inten-
tion to be included in a multiemployer unit.86 Intention, though, has often
proved to be an elusive concept.87
When there is no objection to the formation of a multiemployer unit, the
subjective intent of the parties is sufficient to meet the unequivocal intention
standard.88 When there is an objection, however, the elusive nature of une-
quivocal intention becomes apparent. If an employer objects to a proposed
multiemployer unit,89 the Board may still find that the employer has expressed
84. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text supra.
85. Evening News Ass'n, 154 N.L.R.B. 1494, 1496 (1965), enforced sub nom. Detroit News-
papers Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967).
86. See, e.g., Authorized Air Conditioning Co. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 1979);
McAx Sign Co. v. NLRB, 576 F.2d 62, 66 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979);
NLRB v. Beckham, Inc., 564 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Bagel Bakers Council, 434
F.2d 884, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971); Ruan Transport Corp., 234
N.L.R.B. 241, 242 (1978); Van Eerden Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 496, 499 (1965); Kroger Co., 148
N.L.R.B. 569, 573 (1964).
87. The elusiveness of the concept is not, of course, confined to multiemployer unit determi-
nations. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171, 1172 (5th Cir. 1972) (en bane) (per
curiam) ('[I]ntent, motive and purpose are elusive subjective concepts"). See also Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977). See gener-
ally Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative
Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205 (1970).
88. Professor Morris' statement that "subjective intent alone is not sufficient" to constitute
unequivocal intention, C. Morris, supra note 14, at 239, is overbroad; subjective intent alone is
sufficient where there is no objection to formation of the multiemployer unit. See, e.g., Broward
County Launderers & Cleaners Ass'n, Inc., 125 N.L.IRB. 256, 257 (1959); Calumet Contractors
Ass'n, 121 N.L.R.B. 80, 81 (1958).
89. Although the text discusses unequivocal intention with respect to employers, employees
must also acquiesce in the formation of the multiemployer unit. See note 55 and accompanying
text supra. See also James E. Olson (Advice Memorandum), 1976-77 NLRB Dec. 20,062 at
32,101 (1976). When the unit is initially formed, a majority of the employees of each individual
participating employer must consent, expressly or impliedly, to establishment of the unit; a union
and an employer cannot include employees in a multiemployer unit without this consent. See,
e.g., Dancker & Sellew, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 824, 825-26 (1963), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Local
210, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 330 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1964); Morgan Transfer & Storage Co., Inc., 131
N.L.R.B. 1434, 1435 (1961); Mohawk Business Macas. Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 248, 249 (1956); Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1183, 1186-87 (1944). Once a multiemployer unit is formed,
though, a majority of the employees of all the employers participating in the unit must acquiesce
either expressly or impliedly. Consequently, if a majority of the employees of one employer no
longer want to be included in an existing multiemployer unit, but the union wishes to continue
bargaining with the unit, the lack of employee consent "Would not relieve the. . . [employer] of
its obligation to bargain with the union as to the appropriate multi-employer unit, nor justify an
untimely withdrawal from such unit." Sheridan Creations, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1503, 1506 (1964),
enforced, 357 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967). See also Bel-Window,
240 N.L.R.B. 1315, 1315 (1979). See generally C. Morris, supra note 14, at 240; Collins & Free-
man, Multi-employer Bargaining Units, in Appropriate Units for Collective Bargaining 39, 54-56
(P. Nash & G. Blake eds. 1979).
As with employers, see note 89 and accompanying text infra, the Board may find the required
unequivocal intention even in the face of a union objection to a multiemployer unit; the Board
may infer unequivocal intention from the existence of a substantial multiemployer bargaining
history. Stouffer Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 1331, 1332 (1952). See Foley Constr. Co., 134 N.L.R.B.
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an unequivocal intention to be included in the unit if there is a substantial
history of multiemployer bargaining with the employer.90 A substantial his-
tory of multiemployer bargaining, though, does not always result in a finding
of unequivocal intention; the Board on occasion has found the required inten-
tion lacking even in the face of a multiemployer bargaining history.91 More-
over, a finding of unequivocal intention is not precluded even if there is an
objection and no history of multiemployer bargaining where such bargaining
is typical in the industry.92
Despite this wavering, the use of a substantial multiemployer bargaining
history as evidence of unequivocal intention93 would be useful if this bargain-
ing history could be confidently identified. This, however, is not possible
under current Board doctrine. Although several factors may point to the lack
1385, 1397-99 (1961) (Trial Examiner's decision). Thus, the intention element is as elusive with
respect to employees as it is with respect to employers.
90. See, e.g., Kroger Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 569, 573-74 (1964); Quality Limestone Prods., Inc.,
143 N.L.R.B. 589, 589-92 (1963); Capital District Beer Distribs. Ass'n, 109 N.L.R.B. 176, 178-79
(1954); Waterfront Employers Ass'n, 71 N.L.R.B. 80, 111 (1946). See generally C. Morris, supra
note 14, at 239; Comment, supra note 17, at 564, 570.
91. The Board has found the required intention to be lacking even in the face of a history of
multiemployer bargaining history in several circumstances. The most obvious circumstance is one
in which the employer or union effects a timely withdrawal from the multiemployer negotiation
unit. See notes 104-09 and accompanying text infra. The Board has also refused to recognize a
multiemployer election unit in the face of a multiemployer bargaining history where the merger of
two unions resulted in the dissolution of the union that had bargained with the multiemployer
group and the successor union, although it maintained a substantial identity with the dissolved
union, disclaimed any interest in representing a multiemployer unit. McKesson Wine & Spirits
Co., 232 N.L.R.B. 208, 209 (1977). Finally, a multiemployer bargaining history has not been
controlling when the multiemployer bargaining involved one set of employees of the multiem-
ployer group and the requested Board recognition involved a different set of employees of the
group. See, e.g., NLRB v. E-Z Davies Chevrolet, 395 F.2d 191, 192-93 (9th Cir. 1968) (history of
multiemployer bargaining with respect to mechanic and repairmen employees of multiemployer
group did not justify a multiemployer election unit with respect to the salesmen employees of the
group). See generally C. Morris, supra note 14, at 244-45.
92. See Calumet Contractors Ass'n, 121 N.L.R.B. 80, 81 (1958); Western Ass'n of Eng'rs, 101
N.L.R.B. 64, 64-65 (1952). See generally Collins & Freeman, supra note 89, at 53. But see Chi-
cago Metropolitan Home Builders Ass'n, 119 N.L.R.B. 1184, 1185 (1957).
93. One court has articulated the following test:
[m"he relevant test [is] in the disjunctive: a multi-employer bargaining unit may be estab-
lished either by "a controlling history of collective bargaining on such basis, or an une-
quivocal agreement of the parties to bind themselves to a course of group bargaining in
the future."
McAx Sign Co. v. NLRB, 576 F.2d 62, 66 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979)
(emphasis in original). Although language supportive of such a disjunctive test has found its way
into Board decisions, see Electric Theatre, 156 N.L.R.B. 1351, 1352 (1966), the test is imprecise
and may be misleading. An insensitive application of the disjunctive test would reverse the results
in the cases cited in note 91 supra, because in those cases the Board refused to recognize multiem-
ployer units despite the existence of multiemployer bargaining histories. A substantial multiem-
ployer bargaining history should be considered as an objective indication of unequivocal
intention, not as an alternative to a finding of unequivocal intention. See Van Eerden Co., 154
N.L.R.B. 496, 499 (1965) ("[W]e have often inferred the presence of [unequivocal] intention from
the facts that the employers have participated ... in joint bargaining negotiations and have
adopted ... uniform contracts . . . ."); Quality Limestone Prods., Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 589, 591
(1963) ("Their conduct [in bargaining on a multiemployer basis] throughout indicates that they
evinced an unequivocal intent to be bound by group action .... "); Bennett Stone Co., 139
N.L.R.B. 1422, 1424 (1962) ("[A multiemployer unit may be held to exist when] the employers
have by an established course of conduct unequivocally manifested a desire to be bound. . . by
group rather than individual action.").
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of a substantial94 multiemployer bargaining history-the execution of individ-
ual contracts rather than a group contract, 95 the absence of a formal organiza-
tion,96 and the failure to empower a bargaining agent with binding
authority97-none is determinative. 98 Instead, one is once again left wonder-
ing why the Tar Heels have won so many games.
Board policy on the recognition of multiemployer election and negotia-
tion units thus may have significant consequences, consequences that may en-
courage multiemployer bargaining structures. Nevertheless, the criteria relied
on by the Board in making these unit determinations are uncertain at best.99
The Board protects multiemployer bargaining in a more direct manner, how-
94. The "substantial" requirement has been relatively well-delineated. Although not uni-
formly applied, see, e.g., Acryvin Corp. of Am., 107 N.L.R.B. 917, 918 (1954) (ten month multiem-
ployer bargaining history held sufficient), the Board has tended to follow a one year benchmark in
determining substantiality. See, e.g., Miron Bldg. Prods. Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1406, 1407-08 (1956)
(less than one year is insubstantial); Taylor and Boggis Foundry Div., 98 N.L.R.B. 481,482 (1952)
(nineteen months is substantial); Manufacturers' Protective & Dev. Ass'n, 95 N.L.R.B. 1059, 1061
(1951) (less than one year is insubstantial); Van Iderstine Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 966, 968 (1951) (less
than one year is insubstantial). See generally Collins & Freeman, supra note 89, at 50.
95. Compare cases finding a multiemployer unit to be appropriate despite the execution of
individual contracts, e.g., Bel-Window, 240 N.L.R.B. 1315, 1315 (1979); Quality Limestone Prods.,
Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 589, 590-91 (1963); Samuel Bernstein & Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 1144, 1145 (1952),
with cases finding a multiemployer unit to be inappropriate based in part on the execution of
individual contracts, e.g., Electric Theatre, 156 N.L.R.B. 1351, 1352-53 (1966); Bennett Stone Co.,
139 N.L.R.B. 1422, 1424-25 (1962); Chicago Metropolitan Home Builders Ass'n, 119 N.L.R.B.
1184, 1186 (1957).
96. Compare cases finding a multiemployer unit to be appropriate despite the absence of a
formal employer organization, e.g., Fish Indus. Comm., 98 N.L.R.B. 696, 698 (1952); Metz Brew-
ing Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 409, 410 (1952); Abbotts Dairies, Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. 1064, 1067 (1952), with
cases finding a multiemployer unit to be inappropriate based in part on the absence of such an
organization, e.g., Electric Theatre, 156 N.L.R.B. 1351, 1352 (1966).
97. Compare cases finding a multiemployer unit to be appropriate despite the failure to em-
power a bargaining agent with binding authority, e.g., Fish Indus. Comm., 98 N.L.R.B. 696, 698
(1952), with cases finding a multiemployer unit to be inappropriate based in part on the failure to
empower a bargaining agent with binding authority, e.g., Bennett Stone Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1422,
1424 (1962).
98. Other factors are equally nondeterminative. Fluctuating membership in the multiem-
ployer group, for example, is nondeterminative. Compare Bennett Stone Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1422,
1424-25 (1962) (no multiemployer unit) with Quality Limestone Prods., Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 589,
591 (1963) (multiemployer unit) and Samuel Bernstein & Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 1144, 1145-46 (1952)
(multiemployer unit).
Perhaps the most egregious recent multiemployer unit determination was enforced in McAx
Sign Co. v. NLRB, 576 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979). In Mc,4x a
multiemployer negotiation unit was recognized because of a multiemployer bargaining history
even though contracts were signed by individual companies; there was no formal employers' asso-
ciation; there was no prebargaining agreement among employers that they were negotiating as a
group; and there was no announcement during negotiations that the employers were acting as a
group. Id. at 64; id. at 69 (Godbold, J., dissenting). See generally Collins & Freeman, supra note
89, at 52-53.
99. It should be noted that multiemployer unit determinations are not uncertain at the outer
ends of the multiemployer-single employer continuum. If a union and certain employers want to
take advantage of Board policy on multiemployer bargaining, it should be relatively easy for them
to establish a clear multiemployer bargaining situation. Similarly, if.the parties desire to avoid
multiemployer bargaining, that should be easy to do. If, however, the parties want to retain flex-
ibility or obtain some but not all of the benefits of multiemployer bargaining, the situation be-
comes hazy. The gray area in the center of the continuum is large in proportion to the clear areas
on either end of the spectrum.
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ever, by limiting the ability of unions and employers to withdraw from mul-
tiemployer bargaining structures.
B. Board Policy on Withdrawal from Mul/employer Negotiation Units
Current Board policy protects established multiemployer bargaining
structures by limiting the ability of unions and employers to withdraw from
these structures. Assume, for example, that Union and Companies A, B and C
have begun bargaining on a multiemployer basis. Company A then decides
that it would prefer to negotiate on an individual employer basis. Current
Board policy prohibits Company A from withdrawing from the multiemployer
group absent either "mutual consent" or "unusual circumstances."' 00 This
Board policy directly protects established multiemployer bargaining structures
because these structures cannot be broken up by the unilateral actions of a
participant.
The Board has not always maintained this restrictive withdrawal policy;
early Board cases permitted virtually unrestricted withdrawal. 10 1 In the early
1950s, the Board began to impose restrictions on withdrawal rights.102 In a
1958 decision, Retail Associates, Inc., 03 the Board established specific with-
drawal guidelines that have guided the Board and the courts 1°4 ever since:
We would. . . refuse to permit the withdrawal of an employer or a
union from a duly established multiemployer bargaining unit, except
upon adequate written notice given prior to the date set by the con-
tract for modification, or to the agreed-upon date to begin the mul-
tiemployer negotiations. Where actual bargaining negotiations
based on the existing multiemployer unit have begun, we would not
permit, except on mutual consent, an abandonment of the unit upon
which each side has committed itself to the other, absent unusual
circumstances.10 5
The Retail Associates guidelines set forth different standards for with-
drawal before negotiations begin than for withdrawal after the commencement
of negotiations. Before negotiations begin,' 06 unions107 and employers may
100. Retail Assocs., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 395 (1958).
101. E.g., Economy Shade Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 1552, 1553 n.4 (1950); Pacific Metals Co., 91
N.L.R.B. 696, 699-700 (1950); Bercut-Richards Packing Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 605, 606-07 (1946). See
generally Collins & Freeman, supra note 89, at 64; Meltzer, Single-Employer and Multi-Employer
Lockouts Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 70, 91-94 (1956); Comment, supra note
17, at 571.
102. See Washington Hardware Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 1001, 1003 (1951); Milk & Ice Cream Deal-
ers, 94 N.L.R.B. 23, 25 (1951); Engineering Metal Prods. Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 823, 824 (1950). See
generally Collins & Freeman, supra note 89, at 64 n.91; Comment, supra note 17, at 572.
103. 120 N.L.R.B. 388 (1958).
104. The RetailAssociates guidelines have been accepted by the courts. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 70, 470 F.2d 509, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973); NLRB v. Dover Tavern Owners Ass'n, 412 F.2d 725, 728 (3d Cir. 1969); NLRB v.
Tulsa Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 367 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Sheridan Creations,
Inc., 357 F.2d 245, 247-48 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
105. Retail Assocs., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. at 395.
106. Although Retail Associates indicates that the prenegotiation withdrawal rules apply
"prior to the date set by the contract for modification, or to the agreed-upon date to begin the
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withdraw from established multiemployer negotiation units by providing writ-
ten notice10 8 of an unequivocal intent' 0 9 to withdraw." 10 After the commence-
multi-employer negotiations," id. at 395, the Board has applied the rules prior to the date negotia-
tions actually begin. See, e.g., South Tex. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors, 238 N.L.R.B.
156, 156 n.3 (1978); Local 260 of the Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers Int'l Union, 228 N.L.R.B.
1347, 1351-52 (1977); Carvel Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 111, 112 (1976), enforced, 560 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1065 (1978); Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 70, 195 N.L.R.B.
454, 459-60 (1972). The issue of when negotiations actually begin, however, is not always easy to
determine. See, e.g., Carvel Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 111 (1976) (negotiations begun by a phone call and
exchange of letters). Consequently, parties desiring to limit withdrawal rights may attempt to
commence negotiations before the formal commencement of negotiations. Inequities may result.
See, e.g., Carvel Co., id. (company could not withdraw after negotiations commenced by a phone
call and exchange of letters even though letters were not submitted to the formal negotiations
committee and even though the company was unaware of the phone call and letters). See gener-
ally Collins & Freeman, supra note 89, at 67-69. In addition, as with any per se rule, withdrawal
rights may depend on artificial factors that have virtually no relation to the policy underpinnings
of the rule. See, e.g., South Tex. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors, 238 N.L.R.B. 156, 156 n.3
(1978) (withdrawal rights dependent on whether first bargaining session began with union giving
its proposals to bargaining agent for employers or with bargaining agent giving union list of with-
drawing employers).
107. Even though Retail Associates clearly stated that its withdrawal rules applied to both
unions and employers, the notion lingered that the withdrawal rights of unions may be more
restricted than those of employers. See Comment, supra note 17, at 575-77. In 1965, however, the
Board explicitly held that "the existing rules governing employer withdrawal from multiemployer
units should be applied on an equal basis to union withdrawl from such units." Evening News
Ass'n, 154 N.L.R.B. 1494, 1501 (1965), enforced sub nom. Detroit Newspapers Publishers Ass'n v.
NLRB, 372 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1976). See also Publishers' Ass'n v. NLRB, 364 F.2d 293 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966).
108. Although Retail.Associates clearly requires a written notice, 120 N.L.R.B. at 395, it does
not indicate to whom the notice must be given. But see Collins & Freeman, supra note 89, at 70-
71 (suggesting that Interstate Constr. Co., 229 N.L.R.B. 271 (1977), may indicate an easing of the
written notice requirement). While it is clear that notice must be given to the union, see, e.g.,
Goodsell & Vocke, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 60, 66 (1976), enforced, 559 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1977);
Komer Kafe, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1157, 1163-64 (1966), dicta in some cases indicate that notice also
must be given to the association. See NLRB v. Central Plumbing Co., 492 F.2d 1252, 1255 (6th
Cir. 1974); Audit Serv., Inc. v. Brasel & Sims Constr. Co., 176 Mont. 1, 7-8, 575 P.2d 908, 910-11
(1978). Presumably, the rationale is that it is as important for the association to know who it is
bargaining for as it is for the union to know who it is bargaining with. In this connection, at least
one court has stated in dicta that association-imposed restrictions on an employer's right to with-
draw are unenforceable. NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 1961). See
generally Note, From Chains of Iron to Ropes of Sand: Employer Withdrawal From Multiem-
ployer Bargaining After Steel Fabricators, 45 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1283, 1298 n.71 (1979). See also
note 114 and accompanying text infra.
109. RetailAssociates defined unequivocal intent to mean that the decision "must contemplate
a sincere abandonment, with relative permanency, of the multiemployer unit and the embrace-
ment of a different course of bargaining on an individual-employer basis." 120 N.L.R.B. at 394.
The withdrawal, then, must not be conditional, Universal Insulation Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. 1397
(1964), enforced, 361 F.2d 406 (6th Cir. 1966) (no withdrawal where employer said he would
remain in association unless association negotiated a contract with a wage increase), or construc-
tive, see, e.g., NLRB v. Paskesz, 405 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1969) (no withdrawal when association
suspended employer from association after deliberate nonpayment of dues); Kasco Trucking
Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 627 (1961) (no withdrawal merely because employer ceased to pay associa-
tion dues). Rather, the employer must act in good faith, Walker Elec. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1214,
1221 (1963) (no withdrawal where there is "secrecy and want of good faith"); Town & Country
Dairy, 136 N.L.R.B. 517, 523 (1962) (no withdrawal where it "was more a tactical bargaining
maneuver than a bona fide attempt to withdraw from multiemployer bargaining"); Retail Assocs.,
Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. at 394 (withdrawal may not be used "as a measure of momentary expedience,
or strategy"), and must abandon group bargaining, Anderson Lithograph Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 920
(1959), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Jeffries Banknote Co., 281 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1960) (no with-
drawal where employer continued to participate in group negotiations after withdrawal).
110. Even this relatively liberal withdrawal rule is restricted by the Board's one year certifica-
tion rule. If the Board has certified the multiemployer unit, the Board will not permit withdrawal
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ment of negotiations, unions and employers may withdraw only with mutual
consent or under unusual circumstances."' By mutual consent 1 2 the Board
initially meant the consent of the individual employer and union involved" 13
but has recently required the consent of the association as well." 14 With one
exception, the delineation of unusual circumstances permitting withdrawal has
been noncontroversial. Dire economic'hardship, "s dissolution or fragmenta-
tion of the multiemployer group," 16 and substantial confficts of interest within
the multiemployer group 17 have all been recognized as unusual circum-
stances justifying withdrawal. The Board has refused to recognize a bargain-
for a reasonable period of time, usually one year. Southwestern Colo. Contractors Ass'n, 153
N.L.R.B. 1141, 1142-43 (1965).
111. Retail Assocs., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. at 395.
112. Consent can be either express or implied. Implied consent, however, will not be based on
a mere failure to protest withdrawal, Fairmont Foods Co., v. NLRB, 471 F.2d 1170, 1173 (8th Cir.
1972); NLRB v. John J. Corbett Press, Inc., 401 F.2d 673, 675 (2d Cir. 1968), but must be based
instead on conduct "clearly antithetical" to a claim that consent has not been given. I.C. Refriger-
ation Serv., Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 687, 689 (1972). See generally Collins & Freeman, supra note 89,
at 71-74; Note, supra note 108, at 1298-99 n.73.
113. In RetailAssociates the Board expressed concern only with employers and unions. 120
N.L.R.B. at 393 ("the right of withdrawal by either a union or employer") (emphasis added); id. at
395 ("[W]e would.., refuse to permit the withdrawal of an employer or a union . . . except on
mutual consent .. ") (emphasis added). Until recently, the cases that subsequently applied the
Retail Associates guidelines had with near unanimity focused on union consent to an employer
withdrawal. See, e.g., cases cited in note 112 supra. In addition, the commentators have discussed
only union consent when considering the issue. See, e.g., Collins & Freeman, supra note 89, at 7 1-
74 ("[Tlhe Retail Associates rules contemplates employer withdrawal .. only in the event of
consent by the union. ... ) (emphasis added); Note, supra note 108, at 1298-99 n.73 ("Consent
may be implied from a union's course of conduct. ... ) (emphasis added); Comment, supra note
17, at 575 ("Under the union consent exception, compliance with the withdrawal rules is unneces-
sary where the union . . . recognizes [a] withdrawal.") (emphasis added).
114. Teamsters Union Local No. 378 (Capital Chevrolet Co.), 243 N.L.R.B. 1086 (1979). See
also Joseph J. Callier, 243 N.L.R.B. 1114, 1117 n.8 (1979), enforced, 630 F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1980).
But cf. Tobey Fine Papers, 245 N.L.R.B. 1393, 1395 & n.10 (1979) (individual employer need not
obtain association's consent to withdraw, but association can successfully object to an attempted
withdrawal by filing a refusal-to-bargain charge), enforced, 91 Lab. Cas. 112,701 (8th Cir. 1981).
The primary policies cited by the Board in support of its restrictive withdrawal rules support this
recent requirement. "[F]ostering and maintaining stability in bargaining relationships" is the pri-
mary policy cited in RetailAssociates in support of restrictive withdrawal rules. 120 N.L.R.B. at
393, 395. If stability would be enhanced by allowing withdrawals by individual employers only if
the union consents, stability would be enhanced a fortiori if such withdrawals were allowed only if
both the union and the employer association consent.
115. See North Am. Refractories Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 480, 481-83 (1978); Spun-Jee Corp., 171
N.L.R.B. 557, 558 (1968); U.S. Lingerie Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 750, 751 (1968). But see Tulsa Sheet
Metal Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 367 F.2d 55, 58 (10th Cir. 1966); Co-Ed Garment Co., 231 N.L.R.B.
848, 848, 854 (1977).
116. See NLRB v. Southwestern Colo. Contractors' Ass'n, 447 F.2d 968, 969-70 (10th Cir.
1971); Typographic Serv. Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 1565, 1566 (1978); Connell Typesetting Co., 212
N.L.R.B. 918, 921 (1974).
117. See NLRB v. Siebler Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 563 F.2d 366, 371 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 437 U.S. 911 (1978); NLRB v. Unelko Corp., 71 Lab. Cas. 13,764 at 27,344 (7th Cir.
1973). The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Siebler re-
versed the Board's decision. See Siebler Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 1124
(1975). The Board, however, merely affirmed the finding of an administrative law judge that no
severe conflict of interest existed. Id. at 1124, 1131. Thus, the Board was not required to deter-
mine whether a substantial conflict of interest would constitute an unusual circumstance justifying
withdrawal. On the other hand, the Board has not yet acquiesced in the conflict of interest rulings
of the Seventh and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal. Consequently, it is possible that the Board
and the courts of appeals may disagree on whether a substantial conflict of interest is an unusual
circumstance. That potential disagreement, however, has clearly not risen to the level of the disa-
[Vol. 60
MULTIEMPLO YER BARGAINING
ing impasse as an unusual circumstance, 18 although most courts of appeals
that have considered the issue have disagreed."
19
Permitting withdrawal after a bargaining impasse, as many courts of ap-
peals have done, severely undermines the Board policy of protecting estab-
lished multiemployer negotiation units. 120 Despite protestations to the
contrary by a court of appeals, 12 a bargaining impasse is an event that can be
manipulated by the parties.' 22 Consequently, a party that wishes to withdraw
and has control over the bargaining process can precipitate a bargaining im-
passe and avoid the Board's restrictive withdrawal policies.
greement over whether a bargaining impasse is an unusual circumstance. See notes 118-19 and
accompanying text infra.
It should be noted that, in light of the Board's generally restrictive withdrawal policies, the
Board may resist recognizing conflicts of interest as unusual circumstances that justify withdrawal.
Such a recognition could greatly increase the ability of employers to withdraw. The potential
variety of conflicts is infinite and the existence of some conflict between association members is
inevitable. Indeed, virtually any time an individual employer seeks to withdraw, a conflict arises
since it is in the interest of the association to bolster its bargaining power with a unified front. See
Collins & Freeman, supra note 89, at 80. See also notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra.
118. Despite disagreement by several courts of appeals, see note 119 infra, the Board has con-
tinued to refuse to recognize a bargaining impasse as an unusual circumstance justifying with-
drawal. See, e.g., Seattle Auto Glass, 246 N.L.R.B. 94, 96 (1979); Golden Bear Motors, Inc., 245
N.L.R.B. 300, 300 n.2 (1979); Western Pac. Roofing Corp., 244 N.L.R.B. 501, 501 n.1 (1979);
Marine Mach. Works, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 1098, 1099 (1979), enforced, 635 F.2d 522 (5th Cir.
1981); Florida Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1034, 1035 (1978); Charles D. Bonanno Linen
Serv., Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 629, 630-31 (1977), enforced, 630 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted,
101 S. Ct. 1512 (1981); Bill Cook Buick, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1094, 1096 (1976).
119. H & D, Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 139, 142 (9th Cir. 1980); Authorized Air Conditioning
Co. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 899, 907 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); NLRB v. Acme
Wire Works, Inc., 582 F.2d 153, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Independent Ass'n of Steel
Fabricators, Inc., 582 F.2d 135, 146 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1130 (1979); NLRB v.
Beck Engraving Co., 522 F.2d 475,483 (3d Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Associated Shower Door Co., 512
F.2d 230, 232 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975); Fairmont Foods Co. v. NLRB, 471 F.2d
1170,1172-73 (8th Cir. 1972). But see NLRB v. Marine Mach. Works, Inc., 635 F.2d 522 (5th Cir.
1981) (reversing NLRB v. Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 500 F.2d 181, 183-84 (5th Cir. 1974)); NLRB
v. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 630 F.2d 25, 28-35 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S.
Ct. 1512 (1981).
120. Although this section discusses current Board policy on multiemployer bargaining, it
should be noted that undermining Board protection of multiemployer negotiation units may not
be undesirable. See notes 171-77, 188-89 and accompanying text infra.
121. See NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 522 F.2d 475, 483 (3d Cir. 1975).
122. Simply stated, an impasse is "a state of facts in which the parties, despite the best of faith,
are simply deadlocked." NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472, 482 (5th Cir. 1963). See also
American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (An
impasse occurs when "there [is] no realistic possibility that continuation of discussion at that time
[will be] fruitful."). Although the Board has identified several factors that are relevant to an im-
passe determination, see Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478, enforced sub nom. Ameri-
can Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see generally
Comment, Impasse in Collective Bargaining, 44 Tex. L. Rev. 769 (1966), the determination re-
mains at best a "matter ofjudgment," 163 N.L.R.B. at 478, or at worst a "visceral reaction of the
trial examiner and the Board to the record," Stewart & Engeman, Impasse, Collective Bargaining
and Action, 39 U. Cin. L. Rev. 233, 241 (1970).
Because of the hazy nature of impasse and because the Act "does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession," 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976), a party can
create a bargaining impasse merely "by adhering to a position known to be unacceptable to the
other side." NLRB v. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 630 F.2d 25, 34 (Ist Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 1512 (1981), enforcing 243 N.L.R.B. 1093 (1979). See Note, Labor-Effect of
Negotiating Impasse on Employer's Right to Withdraw From a Multi-Employer Bargaining Asso-
ciation-NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 17 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 525, 539 (1976); Note,
supra note 102, at 1318.
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The courts of appeals that have adopted an impasse withdrawal rule jus-
tify the rule as necessary to preserve the balance of economic power between
unions and employers. Upon impasse, the argument goes, the union can en-
gage in selective strikes while simultaneously entering into interim agree-
ments123 with individual employers. Unions can combine the strike with
interim agreements to whipsaw124 the members of a weakened multiemployer
negotiation unit.125 In contrast, the only economic response available to em-
ployers is a lockout, and even that weapon is weak where individual employ-
ers have entered into interim agreements. 126 Thus, the union has "two
weapons for its economic arsenal . . . while the employers [have] only
one."'127 In an attempt to rectify this imbalance, the courts of appeals have
approved an impasse withdrawal rule that provides employers with an addi-
tional response.
It is ironic that the impasse withdrawal rule actually aids unions more
123. "Interim" agreements with individual employers must be contrasted with "final" agree-
ments with individual employers. Interim agreements are applicable only until the multiemployer
group reaches a final agreement with the union; an interim agreement is superceded when a mul-
tiemployer agreement is reached. A final agreement, on the other hand, would bind the employer
and the union even after a multiemployer agreement is reached. See NLRB v. Marine Mach.
Works, Inc., 635 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1981); Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 243 N.L.R.B.
1093 (1979), enforced, 630 F.2d 25 (Ist Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1512 (1981).
Under current Board policy, the employer association can prevent individual employer-mem-
bers from entering into final agreements. See Teamsters Union Local No. 378, 243 N.L.R.B. 1086,
1089 n.14 (1979); Joseph J. Callier, 243 N.L.R.B. 1114, 1118 (1979), enforced, 630 F.2d 595 (8th
Cir. 1980). In addition, if an employer-member does enter into a final agreement, the Board may
permit the remaining employer-members to withdraw from the multiemploycr negotiation unit
because the agreement may have "effectively fragmented. . . and destroyed. . . the integrity of
the bargaining unit," thus creating an "unusual circumstance." Typographic Serv. Co., 238
N.L.R.B. 1565, 1566 (1978); Connell Typesetting Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 918, 921 (1974). See note 114
and accompanying text supra. But see Tobey Fine Papers, 245 N.L.R.B. 1393, 1395 (1977) (em-
ployer-members are not automatically entitled to withdraw when a fellow employer-member en-
ters into a separate final agreement; rather, withdrawal rights will depend on the effect that an
individually negotiated final agreement has on viability of multiemployer bargaining).
In contrast, under current Board policy, interim agreements cannot be vetoed by the associa-
tion and in most cases will not justify the withdrawal of nonsignatory employer-members of the
multiemployer group. See, e.g., Joseph J. Callier, 243 N.L.R.B. 1114, 1118 (1979), enforced, 630
F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1980); PHC Mechanical Contractors, 191 N.L.R.B. 592, 596 (1971); Sangamo
Constr. Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 159, 160 (1971). Since interim contracts may be one way of breakifig an
impasse and since employers who sign interim contracts remain committed to the multiemployer
negotations, the Board has refused to recognize such contracts as unusual circumstances justifying
withdrawal. But see Connell Typesetting Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 918, 921 (1974) (interim agreements
may justify withdrawal if they are negotiated on such a scale that the multiemployer unit is frag-
mented); Note, Labor Law, supra note 17, at 1265.
The courts of appeals have generally held that the negotiation of individual agreements Justi-
fies unilateral withdrawal by other employer-members of the multiemployer ne~otiation unit, re-
gardless of whether the agreements are interim or final. NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 522 F.2d
475, 582-84 (3d Cir. 1975).
124. See note 41 supra.
125. See NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 522 F.2d 475, 482-83 (3d Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Associ-
ated Shower Door Co., 512 F.2d 230, 232 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975); NLRB
v. Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 500 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1974) (overruled in NLRB v. Marine
Mach. Works, Inc., 635 F.2d 522, (5th Cir. 1981)).
126. NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 522 F.2d 475, 483 (3d Cir. 1975).
127. Id. The balancing of economic weapons in Beck Engraving has been criticized as incoin-
plete. See NLRB v. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 630 F.2d 25,32 & n.15 (1st Cir. 1980),
cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1512 (1981); Note, supra note 122, at 537-38.
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than it aids the employers for whose protection the rule was formulated. To
illustrate, assume the existence of a typical multiemployer bargaining struc-
ture: Union negotiating with Companies A, B and C. Assume first that Union
decides it would be to its advantage to free itself from the bonds of multiem-
ployer bargaining. Since Union is in total control of the bargaining, Union
can precipitate a bargaining impasse 28 and then unilaterally withdraw from
the multiemployer negotiation unit. Union can then demand that Companies
A, B and C each bargain with it on an individual basis.' 29 In a worst case
scenario for Union, Companies A, B and C may refuse to bargain on an indi-
vidual basis with Union, arguing that an impasse did not exist at the time of
Union's withdrawal 130 and, consequently, that Union remains under a duty to
bargain on a multiemployer basis. If Companies A, B and C prevail on that
argument, Union will be placed in the position it was in prior to its attempted
withdrawal, that is, it will be required to bargain on a multiemployer basis
until either an agreement or an impasse is reached.
Assume now that Company A decides it would be to its advantage to free
itself from the multiemployer negotiation unit. If Companies B and C want to
maintain the multiemployer unit, Company A may not control the bargaining
and, hence, may not be able to precipitate a bargaining impasse. In the ab-
sence of an impasse, Company A will not be able to take advantage of the
impasse withdrawal rule. Indeed, since a strike is not always evidence of an
impasse,' 3 ' Company A could not take advantage of the rule even if it was
struck, either by itself or along with Company B and/or Company C. The
ability to negotiate an interim agreement with Union probably will not be
satisfactory to Company A since the interim agreement would be superceded
by the multiemployer agreement as soon as the latter became effective.' 32 Fi-
nally, if Companies B and C objected, Company A could not withdraw even if
Union consented to the withdrawal. 133
Even if Company A and Company B wish to free themselves from the
multiemployer bargaining structure, the impasse withdrawal rule does not
place them in as advantageous a position as Union. Assuming that Compa-
nies A and B control the bargaining and act to precipitate an impasse, they
may err in determining when the impasse came into existence. 134 If they do, a
128. See note 122 supra.
129. See NLRB v. Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, Inc., 582 F.2d 135, 150-51 (2d Cir.
1978); NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 522 F.2d 475, 485-86 (3d Cir. 1975). See generally Note,
supra note 108, at 1308-14 & n.138.
130. See note 122 supra. Compare cases finding that an impasse did not exist, e.g., Authorized
Air Conditioning Co. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 899, 906-07 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950
(1980); NLRB v. Acme Wire Works, Inc., 582 F.2d 153, 157-58 (2d Cir. 1978), with cases finding
that an impasse did exist, e.g., NLRB v. Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, 582 F.2d 135,
147-48 (2d Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 522 F.2d 475, 484-85 (3d Cir. 1975).
131. Rather than evidence of impasse, a strike may be a "mere bargaining strategem." Fair-
mont Foods Co. v. NLRB, 471 F.2d 1170, 1173 (8th Cir. 1972). Indeed, a strike may serve to
break an impasse. R. Gorman, supra note 10, at 450; Stewart & Engeman, supra note 122, at 247.
132. See note 123 supra.
133. See note 114 and accompanying text supra.
134. See note 130 supra.
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worst case scenario would bind Companies A and B to a contract Union nego-
tiated with Company C, a contract that was negotiated without input from
Companies A and B.
Thus, the impasse withdrawal rule operates in practice to aid unions more
than employers. If the courts of appeals were serious about balancing eco-
nomic weapons, they would have disallowed "interim," as well as "final,"'
35
individual bargaining absent the consent of the union, the individual employer
and the association. Then, in the crude calculus of the Third Circuit in NLRB
v. Beck Engraving Co.,'3 6 unions would have one economic weapon (the
strike, selective or otherwise), as would employers (the lockout).
In summary, the Board protects established multiemployer bargaining
structures by restricting the withdrawal rights of unions and employers. The
Board has maintained this policy of affirmative protection despite several cir-
cuit court opinions that, although misguided, have eased the withdrawal
restrictions.
C Public Policy and Current Board Doctrine on Multiemployer Bargaining
The Board has articulated a public policy basis for its support and protec-
tion of multiemployer bargaining. 137 As perceived by the Board, public policy
requires stable multiemployer negotiation units. Board doctrine on multiem-
ployer bargaining attempts to preserve that policy while accommodating the
countervailing interest of employers in retaining control over their own labor
relations.' 38
The Board views multiemployer bargaining as "a vital factor in the effec-
tuation of the national policy of promoting labor peace through strengthened
collective bargaining."'139 The Board sees multiemployer bargaining as im-
portant because it enables smaller employers to bargain with large unions on
an equal basis; facilitates the development of industry-wide programs benefit-
ting employees, such as pension funds; provides an efficient structure within
which to carry out the bargaining process; and encourages unions and employ-
ers to forward reasonable proposals since concessions will be applied across
135. See note 123 supra.
136. 522 F.2d 475, 483 (1975). See note 127 and accompanying text supra.
137. The clearest and most concise statement of the public policy bases for the Board's mul-
tiemployer doctrine is contained in the Board's brief in NLRB v. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv.,
Inc., 630 F.2d 25 (Ist Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1512 (1981). This is an indication of the
remarkable degree to which Board decisions in this area are devoid of public policy considera-
tions. While several Board decisions allude to "stability in bargaining relationships" as a public
policy basis for its multiemployer bargaining doctrine, see, e.g., Retail Assocs., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B.
388, 393 (1958), or other equally vague public policy bases, see, e.g., Rayonier Inc., 52 N.L.R.B.
1269, 1274 (1943) (multiemployer bargaining lessens "industrial strife"), none have fully articu-
lated the reasons for those conclusions or engaged in a more sophisticated analysis of public pol-
icy. See notes 147-63 and accompanying text infra. See also Comment, Withdrawal from Multi-
Employer Bargaining-Reconsidering RetailAssociates, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 464, 472-73 (1967).
138. See Brief for NLRB at 8-9, NLRB v. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 630 F.2d 25
(1st Cir. 1980).
139. Id.'at 9 (quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 95 (1957)).
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the industry and, hence, will not result in competitive disadvantage. 140
Because of the desirability of multiemployer bargaining, the Board has
attempted to bolster the stability of such bargaining relationships. 14 1 The
Board has done that primarily by restricting withdrawal rights, but also by
recognizing multiemployer election units. In the absence of such steps, the
Board believes that the stability of multiemployer bargaining would be under-
mined and the public benefits derived from multiemployer bargaining would
be lost. For example, the Board argues, "if a party were free to withdraw
whenever the tide of negotiations appeared to be running against its own per-
ceived best interests, many multiemployer units would founder on the rocks of
temporary disagreements and. . . the public would be denied the. . . bene-
fits of multiemployer bargaining." 142 In addition, the stability of multiem-
ployer bargaining would be undermined because the employers' bargaining
representative would have to take extreme bargaining positions to satisfy all
group members and neither the companies nor the union could be assured that
the agreement reached would be accepted by all the employers. 143
The Board thus views multiemployer bargaining as central to national
labor policy. Consequently, it has formulated a multiemployer doctrine that
supports and protects multiemployer bargaining. The following section criti-
cally examines this doctrine.
III. A NEW LOOK AT BOARD DOCTRINE ON
MULTIEMPLOYER BARGAINING
Multiemployer bargaining predates the National Labor Relations Act. 144
Although public policy on multiemployer bargaining was debated vigorously
in the years following enactment of the Act,145 the subject has faded from
140. Id. at 9-10. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 94-96 (1957);
Evening News Ass'n, 154 N.L.R.B. 1494, 1499-500 & n.19 (1965), enforced sub nom. Detroit
Newspapers Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967).
141. Stability has been a recurrent and vital theme in Board cases on multiemployer bargain-
ing. In the first case to impose restrictions on withdrawal rights, the Board stated that unlimited
withdrawal "would not make for that stability in collective bargaining which the Act seeks to
promote." Engineering Metal Prods. Corp., 92 N.L.R.B. 823, 824 (1950). RetailAssociates, the
case which has been the backbone of the Board's withdrawal doctrine since the time it was de-
cided, was based on a stability argument. 120 N.L.R.B. at 393 ("[TIhe stability requirement of the
Act dictates that reasonable controls limit ... withdrawal ... from an established multiem-
ployer bargaining unit."). See also Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 1093
(1979), enforced, 630 F.2d 25 (Ist Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1512 (1981); Connell Type-
setting Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 918, 921 (1974).
142. Brief for NLRB at 11, NLRB v. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 630 F.2d 25 (Ist
Cir. 1980).
143. Id. at 11-12.
144. See note 5 supra.
145. See, e.g., J. Backman, Multi-Employer Bargaining (1951); G. Bahrs, supra note 32; N.
Feinsinger, supra note 16; W. Fisher, supra note 18; J. Freidin, supra note 44; S. Garrett & L.
Tripp, Management Problems Implicit in Multi-Employer Bargaining (1949); C. Kerr & R. Ran-
dall, supra note 19; B. Levy, Multi-Employer Bargaining and the Anti-Trust Laws (1949); F. Pier-
son, supra note 5; 0. Pollak, supra note 16; R. Tilove, supra note 31; Industry-Wide Collective
Bargaiing: Promise or Menace (C. Warne ed. 1950); Proceedings of the Conference on Industry-
Wide Collective Bargaining (1949). See also note 4 supra.
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academic consciousness. Recent comments have focused not on the viability
of multiemployer policy generally, but on specific aspects of that policy. 146 A
critical examination of the public policy bases of current Board doctrine and
of the problems created by the doctrine are the bases for the guidelines for
change that conclude this section.
A. Analysis of Public Policy and Board Doctrine
The Board has articulated relatively inflexible rules to govern multiem-
ployer bargaining. 147 These rules lead to predictability of result, but do not
recognize the multiplicity of policies, both public and private, which influence
and shape multiemployer bargaining structures.
The Board doctrine on multiemployer bargaining walks a public policy
tightrope. Public policy, in the Board's view, does not require the establish-
ment of multiemployer bargaining structures. A single employer unit is still
presumptively appropriate.' 48 On the other hand, public policy does require
the maintenance of established multiemployer bargaining structures.149 Pre-
sumably then, public policy in favor of multiemployer bargaining structures is
sufficiently strong to require the latter, but not the former. Although such an
analysis of public policy is not unique,150 it is both unsophisticated and
incomplete.
The Board's public policy analysis is unsophisticated because it fails to
distinguish between public policies and private preferences. The Board's dis-
cussion of alleged "public" policies is actually a recitation of some of the fac-
tors private parties, union or employer, might rely upon when deciding to
engage in multiemployer rather than single-employer bargaining.' 5 ' For ex-
146. See, e.g., Note, supra note 122; Note, supra note 108; Note, Labor Law, supra note 17.
Current commentaries that consider multiemployer bargaining more comprehensively focus on
Board rules rather than the policies underlying those rules. See, e.g., C. Morris, supra note 14;
Collins & Freeman, supra note 89.
147. See, e.g., Retail Assocs., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. at 395. See also Collins & Freeman, supra
note 89, at 64-65; Note, supra note 108, at 1297 n.69.
148. See, e.g., Cab Operating Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 878, 879-90 (1965); Carbondale Retail
Druggists Ass'n, 131 N.L.R.B. 1021, 1022 (1961); John Breuner Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 394, 396 (1960).
149. See notes 103-19 and accompanying text supra.
150. The Supreme Court, for example, has been more willing to allow class actions to continue
in the face of an article III challenge when the named plaintiff loses his personal claim after the
case is filed (mootness) than when the named plaintiff loses his personal claim before the case is
filed (standing). Compare mootness cases, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,755-
57 & n.9 (1976); United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397-407 (1980) with
standing cases, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. North Carolina Envt'l Control Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,
72 (1978). Arguably, public policy is sufficiently strong to justify continuation of class actions
where the named plaintiff's personal claim has been mooted but not strong enough to justify
continuation of class actions where the named plaintiff lacks standing. See Kane, Standing, Moot-
ness, and Federal Rule 23-Balancing Perspectives, 26 Buffalo L. Rev. 83, 107-09 (1977); Note,
The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373, 376-77 (1974). But see
Willborn, Personal Stake, Rule 23, and the Employment Discrimination Class Action, 22 B.C,L.
Rev. 1, 15-16 (1980).
151. Most commentators have joined the Board in failing to distinguish between public poli-
cies and private preferences. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 17, at 558-61; Note, Labor Law,
supra note 17, at 1257-58. Few have attempted to translate the readily apparent private prefer-
ences into public policy. See, e.g., Taylor, Public Interest in Establishment of Standard Employ-
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ample,152 the Board cites the ability of smaller employers to bargain on an
equal basis with a larger union.153 By itself, that certainly is a reason employ-
ers may wish to engage in multiemployer bargaining; it is also a reason unions
may wish to refrain from such bargaining. This reasoning does not explain
why there should be apublicpolicy of support for multiemployer bargaining,
and the Board does not explain the nexus between these private interests and
public policy. Perhaps by enhancing the economic power of smaller employ-
ers, multiemployer bargaining will redress a perceived inequality of bargain-
ing power between employers and unions 154 and thus promote "actual liberty
of contract."155 On the other hand, restrictive withdrawal rules may bind
smaller employers to weakened and fragmented multiemployer negotiation
units and, as a result, aggravate rather than mitigate imbalances in bargaining
power. Moreover, if equality of bargaining power is a goal of the Board's
multiemployer bargaining doctrine, the doctrine is woefully inadequate; it
does not, for example, prohibit multiemployer bargaining structures that cre-
ate, rather than redress, bargaining power imbalances.15 6 The Board, then,
engages in a superficial public policy analysis to support multiemployer bar-
gaining and cites private interests in support of its doctrine without adequate
explanation of the nexus between those private interests and the public
interest.
Although the Board discusses several private preferences supportive of
Board doctrine, it ignores several public policies that deserve consideration in
any meaningful analysis of multiemployer doctrine. The Board does not con-
ment Terms, in Proceedings of the Conference on Industry-Wide Collective Bargaining 16-20
(1949).
152. The example discussed in the text is just that--an example. The Board relies heavily on
private interests to support its multiemployer bargaining doctrine. The Board says that multiem-
ployer bargaining "facilitates the development of industry-wide programs benefiting employees,"
Brief for NLRB at 9, NLRB v. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 630 F.2d 25 (Ist Cir. 1980),
but does not explain how that facilitation affects public policy rather than merely the private
interests of unions and employees. The Board points to the efficiency of the multiemployer struc-
ture, id. at 10, but fails to explain how sudh efficiency benefits the public.
153. Id. at 9. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
154. This policy was evident in the Wagner Act, although at that time the purpose was "to
create aggregations of economic power on the side of employees [to countervail] the existing
power of corporations ... !" Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401,
1407 (1958). See also Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modem Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 282 & n.56 (1978). Here the
policy once again, may be, to balance economic power, but the purpose is to allow aggregations of
economic power on the side of employers to counterbalance that of employees. Cf. Leedom,
Introduction, 29 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 191, 196 (1960) (The aim of the Taft-Hartley Act was to
"strike a balance of power between labor and management" by imposing certain limitations on
unions.).
155. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
156. The Board's doctrine, for example, does not prohibit large and powerful companies from
engaging in multiemployer bargaining with a small and weak union. The Board's multiemployer
bargaining doctrine is at best a crude attempt to balance economic weapons, an attempt that
approaches the limits of the Board's powers under the Act. See American Shipbuilding Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317 (1965) (The Act does "not give the Board a general authority to assess
the relative economic power of the adversaries in the bargaining process. ... ); NLRB v. Insur-
ance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960) (The Act does not "contain a charter for the
... Board to act at large in equalizing disparities of bargaining power between employer and
union.").
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sider the impact of multiemployer bargaining on the economy or on the infla-
tion rate.157 Nor does the Board compare the extent and severity of
multiemployer work stoppages with the extent and severity of single employer
work stoppages. 158 Both are clearly relevant to the formulation of public pol-
icy on multiemployer bargaining; the Board's current support of such bargain-
ing is probably inadvisable if-multiemployer bargaining results in damage to
the economy or in unduly long and severe work stoppages.
Additionally, the Board's public policy analysis is incomplete because it
focuses solely on the institutional interests affected. When citing interests op-
posed to a doctrine of support for multiemployer bargaining, the Board notes
only the interests of the institutional parties-unions and employers-in con-
trolling their own labor relations.1 59 Individual employees may have an
equally significant interest in opposition to a public policy supportive of mul-
tiemployer bargaining.160 Large multiemployer units insulate unions from at-
tacks on their representative status 61 and render it more difficult for dissident,
individual employees to influence union policy and/or bargaining strategy. 162
The interests of individual employees merit consideration in the Board's pub-
lic policy analysis. 163
The Board's analysis of public policy is unsatisfactory, unsophisticated
and incomplete. Perhaps partially because of the inadequacy of the Board's
public policy analysis, the Board's multiemployer bargaining doctrine results
in inequities.
B. Inequity and the Board's Multiemployer Bargaining Doctrine
The Board's rigid multiemployer bargaining policy results in many poten-
tial conflicts with national labor policy. These potential conflicts occur prima-
rily at two points in the bargaining process: (1) during the formation and
determination of election and/or negotiation units and (2) during attempted
157. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
158. See notes 50-51 and accompanying text supra.
159. See Brief for NLRB at 8-9, NLRB v. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 630 F.2d 25
(1st Cir. 1980).
160. At least one court of appeals has recognized that the Board's multiemployer doctrine
"favor[s] continuity in the bargaining structure over the enhancement of employee free choice."
NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 578 (9th Cir. 1980). The court, however, supported
the Board's policy decision in the narrow factual circumstances presented by the case. Id.
161. See notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra.
162. R. Gorman, supra note 10, at 67-68.
163. See The Structure of Collective Bargaining at xxxii (A. Weber ed. 1961). This is particu-
larly the case in light of the concern for individual employees expressed in other areas. See, e.g.,
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (union has a duty to represent all employees fairly and without
discrimination); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962) (union failure to represent all em-
ployees fairly is a violation of the Act), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963); Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976) (establishes a bill of
rights and provides other protections for union members).
It should be noted that this critique of the incompleteness of the Board's public policy analy-
sis is also incomplete. It is not intended as a comprehensive review of the public policies relating
to multiemployer bargaining; rather, it is intended to expose the shallowness of the Board's
inquiry.
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withdrawals from established multiemployer units.16
Perhaps the starkest conflict between the Board's multiemployer policy
and national labor policy arises during the formation of election units. As-
sume, for example, that Incumbent Union has negotiated collective bargaining
contracts for a number of years with a multiemployer unit consisting of Em-
ployers A, B and C. Assume further that Rival Union petitions to displace
Incumbent Union as the representative of the employees of Employer A. As
we have seen,' 65 if Employer A continues in the multiemployer group, the
Board is "likely to rule that the unit has metamorphosed into a multiemployer
unit and that [Rival Union] may only petition for all of the employees encom-
passed by the multiemployer group."'166 If Employer A withdraws from the
multiemployer group, Rival Union's single employer election petition will be
entertained.' 67 This application of the Board's multiemployer doctrine con-
flicts with the national labor policy of protecting the free choice of workers to
select their representatives.1 68 If Rival Union is more militant than Incum-
bent Union and Employer A perceives Rival Union as having little or no sup-
port among employees of Employers B and C, Employer A may decide to
remain in the multiemployer group to make it more difficult for Rival Union
to gain representative status. This tactic may frustrate the ability of Employer
A's employees to be represented by the union of their choice. Perhaps Em-
ployer A would prefer to negotiate with Rival Union (or, even more omi-
nously, perhaps a decertification petition, rather than an election petition, is
filed). Employer A may then decide to withdraw from the multiemployer
group, once again creating the potential of undue influence on its employees'
164. Less obvious conflicts may also arise during the process of normal multiemployer bar-
gaining. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the issue fully, multiemployer
bargaining increases the danger that employers and unions will engage in illegal anti-competitive
conduct. See Leslie, supra note 18, at 1211-12 & n.100; St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the
Expense of Labor Law, 62 Va. L. Rev. 603, 614 (1976).
165. See notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra.
166. D. Leslie, supra note 72, at 102. Rival Union's election petition would be dismissed and
the Board would entertain an election petition only with respect to a multiemployer election unit.
See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
167. Although the Board has intimated that it may disapprove an otherwise valid withdrawal
if the employer acts with other than good faith, see, e.g., Town & Country Dairy, 136 N.L.R.B.
517, 523 (1962) ("withdrawal was more a tactical bargaining maneuver than a bona fide attempt to
withdraw from multiemployer bargaining"); Retail Assocs., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 394 (1958)
("good faith is a necessary requirement in any. . . decision to withdraw"), the Board has permit-
ted employer withdrawal after the filing of an election petition even though the withdrawal
changes the election unit. See Bell Bakeries, 139 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1345-46 (1962); Bearing & Rim
Supply Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 101, 102-03 (1953) (even though employer withdrawal occurred after
filing of decertification petition, withdrawal was effective and employer's reason for withdrawal
was "immaterial"). Cf. Dittler Bros., 132 N.L.R.B. 444, 446 (1961) (attempted withdrawal was
untimely when employer attempted to withdraw when election petition was fied by a rival union
after negotiations had begun with incumbent union); Blue Ribbon Prods. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 562,
564-65 (1953) (attempted withdrawal was ineffective when employers attempted to withdraw to
create single employer election units, but intended to bargain as a multiemployer group if the
union won any of the elections).
168. See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) ("It is ... the policy of the United States to...
[protect] . . . the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing. ... ). See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937); Klare, supra note 146, at 283, 311-12.
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choice of a bargaining representative. 169
Conflicts between the Board's multiemployer bargaining doctrine and na-
tional labor policy may also arise in connection with attempted withdrawals
from multiemployer negotiation units. If an employer abandons a multiem-
ployer negotiation unit and the Board later determines that the withdrawal
was improper, the employer will be bound by the multiemployer contract even
though he had no hand in its negotiation. This may occur in circumstances
where it was extremely difficult for the employer to determine in advance
whether withdrawal would subsequently be determined to be proper or im-
proper.170 This result conflicts with the freedom of contract policies of the
Act 171 and undermines the "mediating" or "therapeutic" effect of bargaining
envisioned by the Act. 172
The Board's rigid withdrawal rules may even conflict with the very poli-
cies they were designed to further. The Board views multiemployer bargain-
ing as a "vital factor in the effectuation of national [labor] policy"'173 and
forwards its withdrawal rules as necessary to preserve and protect such bar-
gaining. 174 It is equally plausible, though, that rigid withdrawal rules inhibit
multiemployer bargaining. As the Board itself has recognized in approving
union withdrawals prior to the commencement of negotiations, "[u]nions, like
employers, would understandably be reluctant to initiate multiemployer bar-
gaining if the decision to do so were virtually irrevocable."' 7 5 Unions and
employers may be more willing to give multiemployer bargaining a try if they
169. Multiemployer bargaining doctrine may also infringe on employee choice of a bargaining
representative in other circumstances. In Sheridan Creations, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1503 (1964), en-
forced, 357 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. .1005 (1967), for example, an employer
attempted to withdraw from a multiemployer negotiation unit after negotiations had begun be-
cause it believed that a majority of its employees no longer supported the union. Id. at 1505. The
Board held that the attempted withdrawal was improper even Jr a majority of the employer's
employees did not support the union; the test of the obligation to bargain, explained the Board, is
whether a majority of the employees of all employer-members of the multiemployer group sup-
ports the union, not whether a majority of the employees of one employer-member supports the
union. Id. at 1505-06. See also NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980).
170. In McAx Sign Co. v. NLRB, 576 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116
(1979), for example, an employer was bound by a multiemployer contract after an attempted
withdrawal when the Board determined that the employer had evidenced an "unequivocal intent"
to bargain on a group basis even though. "There was no evidence of a pre-bargaing agreement
among employers that the group was negotiating as a unit, no pronouncement at bargaining ses-
sions that negotiations were conducted on a group basis, no formal employers' association, and
prior contracts were signed by individual employers designated as such [sic]." Collins & Freeman,
supra note 89, at 53. See notes 84-98 and accompanying text supra.
171. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970) ("One of [the] fundamental poli-
cies [of the Act] is freedom of contract."). See generally Klare, supra note 154, at 293-310 (identi-
fying and criticizing the Act's freedom of contract policy).
172. See Cox, supra note 154, at 1408-09; Klare, supra note 154, at 282 n.54. See also First
National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S. Ct. 2573, 2578 (1981) ("A fundamental aim of the
National Labor Relations Act. .. is the promotion of collective bargaining as-a method of defus-
ing and channeling conflict between labor and management.").
173. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 95 (1A7). See Brief for
NLRB at 9, NLRB v. Charle&'D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 630 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1980).
174. Brief for NLRB at 11, NLRB v. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 630 F.2d 25,(lst
Cir. 1980).
175. Evening News Ass'n, 154 N.L.1.B. 1494, 1499 (1965), enforced sub nom. Detroit News-
papers Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967).
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know they will not be bound to the multiemployer group (and to a multiem-
ployer contract) if the relationship turns sour.'7 6 Thus, under the Board's
withdrawal rules negotiations begun on a multiemployer basis will more prob-
ably be consumated in a multiemployer contract than would be the case with-
out such rules. The rules, however, may inhibit the parties from initiating
negotiations on a multiemployer basis.'
77
There are, then, conflicts between the Board's multiemployer bargaining
doctrine and national labor policy. In addition, there are shortcomings in the
Board's analysis of public policy. The following suggestions for the further
development of Board doctrine on multiemployer doctrine are offered to help
to alleviate the present shortcomings in that policy.
C. Guidelines for the Future Development of Multiemployer
Bargaining Doctrine
The Board's multiemployer bargaining doctrine is not, and should not be,
static. Since it accommodates so many potentially conflicting policies, the
Board should periodically reevaluate its doctrine. Any reevaluation by the
Board should contain a more sophisticated analysis of the public policies bear-
ing on multiemployer bargaining and a sensitive consideration of the
problems fostered by Board doctrine in the area. The courts of appeals should
refuse to grant deference to Board decisions in the absence of such an analysis.
A warning shot in this regard has already been fired by the courts of appeals.
Until the Board clearly articulated the policy basis for its impasse withdrawal
rule,' 78 the courts of appeals rejected it.179 Subsequently,'8 0 the courts of ap-
peals have been more deferential.' 8 '
176. The Board itself has recognized this interest in a case in which the Board eased with-
drawal restrictions. Id. at 1501 (in permitting unions the same withdrawal rights as employers
rather than more restricted ones, the Board recognized that rigid restrictions on withdrawal
"would preclude possible future experimentation with and expansion of [multiemployer]
bargaining").
177. The author has been unable to locate any articles that have urged an easing of the
Board's withdrawal rules as a means of encouraging experimentation in bargaining structure.
Rather, the commentators have generally urged a tightening of the withdrawal rules to enhance
"stability," while ignoring the disincentive created. See,e.g., Note, supra note 108, at 1318; Com-
ment, supra note 17, at 590-92.
178. For an explanation of the Board's impasse withdrawal rule, see notes 17-18 and accompa-
nying text supra.
179. See NLRB v. Acme Wire Works, Inc., 582 F.2d 153, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1978); NLRB v.
Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, Inc., 582 F.2d 135, 146 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1130 (1979); NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 522 F.2d 475, 483 (3d Cir. 1975); NLRB v.
Associated Shower Door Co., 512 F.2d 230, 232 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975);
NLRB v. Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 500 F.2d 181, 183-84 (5th Cir. 1974) (overruled by NLRB v.
Marine Mach. Works, Inc., 635 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1981)).
180. The Board clearly articulated the policy basis for its impasse withdrawal rule in Charles
D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 1093 (1979), enforced, 630 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1980),
cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1512 (1981).
181. See NLRB v. Marine Mach. Works, Inc., 635 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1981) (overruling Hi-
Way Billboards, Inc., 500 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1974)); NLRB v. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv.,
Inc., 630 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1512 (1981). But see H & D, Inc. v.
NLRB, 633 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1980); Authorized Air Conditioning Co. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 89)
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980).
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The Board's re-examination of public policy must consider thepublic in-
terests in multiemployer bargaining, as well as the preferences of private par-
ties. It must also survey those interests more comprehensively than the Board
has to date. That is, the Board must consider the effect multiemployer bar-
gaining may have on the economy, 182 on the extent and severity of work stop-
pages and on the legitimate interests of individual employees. It is ironic, at
the least, that the Board has considered the effect of multiemployer bargaining
on the relative bargaining power of unions and employers 8 3 even though the
Supreme Court has held such considerations improper, 84 and yet has virtu-
ally ignored the effect of multiemployer bargaining on the interests of individ-
ual employees even though Congress and the courts have attempted to actively
protect such interests.'85 This important topic requires a more sophisticated
public policy analysis.
A more sophisticated analysis may lead to a reconsideration of the
Board's active support and protection of multiemployer bargaining. For ex-
ample, the Board may decide that it would be advisable to recognize only
single employer election units. Such a doctrinal change may provide better
protection for individual employees and remove undesirable motivations for
engaging in multiemployer bargaining. 186 In addition, it would provide more
direct employee participation in the bargaining structure decision.'8 7 Simi-
larly, the Board may decide to abandon its rigid withdrawal rules in favor of
more flexible withdrawal rules that consider the intent and effect of the with-
drawal.188 Revised withdrawal rules might encourage bargaining structure
182. Changes in Board policy on multiemployer bargaining will, of course, have only a mini-
mal effect on the economy. Collective bargaining, no matter how well structured, will not solve
this nation's economic problems. See Brown & Schultz, Public Policy and the Structure of Collec-
tive Bargaining, in The Structure of Collective Bargaining 307, 322 (A. Weber ed. 1961). Never-
theless, economic consequences are a relevant consideration in the formulation of a
multiemployer bargaining doctrine. See notes 47-49, 157 and accompanying text supra.
183. See Brief for NLRB at 9, NLRB v. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 630 F.2d 25
(lst Cir. 1980) ("By joining multi-employer bargaining units, smaller employers are able to bar-
gain 'on an equal basis with a large union .. ' ").
184. See American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317 (1965); NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960). See also note 156 supra.
185. See note 163 supra.
186. A union may engage in multiemployer bargaining to enhance its security, see note 30 and
accompanying text supra, while employers may agree to continue multiemployer bargaining to
favor one union over another, see notes 64-68 and accompanying text supra.
187. The Board's current doctrine of recognizing multiemployer election units is largely one of
deferral to the bargaining structure decisions of unions and employers. See notes 84-86 and ac-
companying text supra. Recognizing only single employer election units would often result in
direct employee participation in the bargaining structure decision. In deciding between an incum-
bent union that has been negotiating on a multiemployer basis and a rival union that would
bargain on an individual employer basis, the employees would have direct influence on the bar-
gaining structure in subsequent negotiations.
188. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1966) (Lumbard,
C. J., dissenting) (withdrawal should be permitted at any time so long as the withdrawing party
acts in good faith and does not prejudice the rights of those remaining in the multiemployer unit),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967). See also Note, supra note 108, at 1297 n.69. Cf. Industrial
Eng'r Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 77, 81 (1968) (claim that employer violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to
sign a multiemployer agreement is rejected because union acted in bad faith in reaching the
agreement).
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experimentation and avoid conflict with the freedom of contract policies of the
Act.189 These types of revisions of Board policy would reduce governmental
involvement in bargaining structure decisions and, conversely, recognize the
competence of the private parties involved to determine the most appropriate
and effective negotiation unit.190
On the other hand, a more sophisticated public policy analysis may lead
the Board to reaffirm its current multiemployer bargaining doctrines. Even if
that is the case, the sophisticated analysis is desirable. The courts of appeals
might be justifiably more inclined to defer to Board doctrine, and a greater
degree of uniformity in national labor policy might be achieved. In addition,
uniformity could be achieved with greater certainty as to the doctrine's policy
objectives.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has reviewed the many factors influencing the bargaining
structure decisions of unions and employers, delineated current Board doc-
trine on multiemployer bargaining, examined the weak public policy analysis
supporting the Board's doctrine and problems created by that doctrine, and
suggested that the Board undertake a new, more sophisticated look at the area.
This "new look" may lead to substantial revisions of the Board's doctrine, or it
may result in a reaffirmation of the doctrinal status quo. What the "new look"
will do, however, is provide a clearer articulation of the policy underpinnings
of the Board's developing multiemployer bargaining doctrine. In addition, it
will spark renewed debate on issues central to this nation's national labor pol-
icy. Debate on these issues, for some reason, fell into an historical crevasse191
and is only now beginning to climb back into the academic consciousness.
That ascent is important to the development of labor law in this country.
189. See notes 171-77 and accompanying text supra.
190. The problem of formulating public policies that would help to shift the various sub-
stantive issues to the most appropriate level of negotiation proves ... [resistant to] sug-
gestion, let alone solution. Since only the parties themselves can know which level is
most "appropriate" for a given issue, any governmental fiat may be wholly unreasona-
ble. Perhaps the soundest approach to this problem is to create an environment suffi-
ciently permissive so that the parties themsleves may determink where and how each
issue is best treated. In effect this means a negative role for government.
The Structure of Collective Bargaining at xxxi (A. Weber ed. 1961). See also Evening News Ass'n,
154 N.L.R.B. 1494, 1500-01 (1965), enforced sub nom. Detroit Newspapers Publishers Ass'n v.
NLRB, 372 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967).
191. See notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra.
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